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ABSTRACT
AN INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO
IDENTIFYING CAUSES OF SYSTEM FAILURES
USING FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
MAY 2016
HUONG PHAN
B.I.T., QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor George S. Avrunin and Professor Lori A. Clarke
This work presents a systematic, incremental approach to identifying causes of
potential failures in complex systems. The approach builds upon Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA), but enhances previous work to deliver better results. FTA has been applied
in a number of domains to determine what combinations of events might lead to a
specified undesired event that represents a system failure. Given an undesired event,
FTA constructs a fault tree (FT) and computes its cut sets, the sets of events that
together could cause the undesired event. Such cut sets provide valuable insights
into how to improve the design of the system being analyzed to reduce the likelihood
of the failure. Manual FT construction can be tedious and error-prone. Previous
approaches to automatic FT construction are limited to systems modeled in specific
modeling languages and often fail to recognize some important causes of failures. Also,
these approaches tend to not provide enough information to help users understand
vi
how the events in a cut set could lead to the specified undesired event and, at the
same time, often provide too many cut sets to be helpful, especially when systems
are large and complex.
Our approach to identifying causes of potential system failures is incremental
and consists of two phases that support selective exploration. In the first phase, a
high-level FT, called the initial FT, is constructed based on the system’s data and
control dependence information and then the initial FT’s cut sets, called the initial
cut sets, are computed. In the second phase, users select one initial cut set for more
detailed analysis. In this detailed analysis, additional control dependence information
is incorporated and error combinations are considered to construct a more detailed
FT, called the elaborated FT, that focuses on the chosen initial cut set. The cut sets
of the elaborated FT, called the elaborated cut sets, are then computed, and concrete
scenarios are generated to show how events in each of those elaborated cut sets
could cause the specified undesired event. Our approach is applicable to any system
model that incorporates control and data dependence information. The approach also
improves the precision of the results by automatically eliminating some inconsistent
and spurious cut sets.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Any complex system is subject to failures. The likelihood of failures, however, can
often be reduced by improving the system design. To do so, one must understand
how a failure might happen, what the causes could be. One approach to identi-
fying causes of potential failures is to use Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), a deductive,
top-down analytical technique used in a variety of industries [12]. In FTA, an un-
desired event representing the system failure is specified, and the system model is
analyzed to find ways that the specified undesired event could occur. FTA includes
two parts: constructing a fault tree (FT) and analyzing the FT. A FT is a graphical
model that depicts the combinations of events that together could cause the speci-
fied undesired event, which is at the top of the FT. Hereafter we use top event to
refer to the undesired event representing the system failure being analyzed. Once the
FT is constructed, different quantitative and qualitative analyses can be applied. To
identify causes of the system failure, one uses a qualitative analysis that computes
the FT’s cut sets, which are combinations of events that might cause the top event.
Straightforward Boolean algebra can be applied to automatically compute a FT’s cut
sets.
Manual FT construction, however, is tedious and error prone. Many have at-
tempted to automate FT construction for various types of systems [3,4,14,21,22,24].
There are still some problems with these previous approaches. They are language de-
pendent; each approach is limited to systems that are modeled in a specific language,
e.g., ADA programs [21], Pascal programs [14], UML models [19,24,34], SysML mod-
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els [22], and Little-JIL process models [3, 4]. They do not appear to fully exploit
control dependence information, hence producing incomplete FTs. In some cases,
published papers show little evidence of evaluation on real complex systems. Further,
the cut sets that are computed often do not provide users with enough information
to understand how all the events in a cut set could happen in a system execution
and lead to the occurrence of the top event. At the same time, these approaches
may provide too many cut sets to be helpful, especially when systems are large and
complex. Finally, these previous approaches do not seem to deal with false positives
— inconsistent and spurious cut sets1.
In an attempt to address the above problems, we investigated a two-phase ap-
proach that lets users incrementally gain deeper understandings of causes of system
failures. Given a system model and an undesired event representing a system fail-
ure, the first phase uses data and control dependence information from the model to
automatically construct, or derive, a high-level FT, called the initial FT, whose top
event is the undesired event. Also in this first phase, the cut sets from the initial
FT, called the initial cut sets, are computed and presented to users. In the second
phase, users can then select one initial cut set as the basis for more detailed analysis.
In this detailed analysis, with the focus on the chosen initial cut set, additional con-
trol dependence information is incorporated and error combinations are considered
to elaborate the initial FT to result in a more detailed FT, called the elaborated FT.
Its cut sets, called the elaborated cut sets, are then computed, and concrete scenarios
for each elaborated cut set are generated. A scenario is a system execution path that
contains all events in an elaborated cut set and shows how the events in the cut set
1A cut set is said to be inconsistent if it is impossible for all of the events in the cut set to occur
in one system execution. A cut set is said to be spurious if all system executions, each of which
contains all events in the cut set and does not contain all events in any other cut set, turn out to
not result in the top event.
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could lead to the top event. After cut sets from FTs are computed, some inconsistent
and spurious cut sets are automatically identified and removed.
We implemented and evaluated our approach by applying it to models of four
non-trivial human-intensive systems from the medical and election domains. As part
of larger projects for modeling and analyzing human-intensive systems, these models
had been created with help from domain experts. These models are defined in Little-
JIL, a process modeling language [33], which provides sufficient control and data flow
information to support our approach. The terms process and system therefore are
used interchangeably from this point forward. By applying our approach to Little-JIL
process models, we show that the approach is generic and applicable to any language
that includes data and control flow information.
The contributions of this work are:
1. An improved approach to identifying causes of system failures using FTA that:
• is systematic in that it is based on data and control dependence, and thus
can be implemented using standard data and control flow analysis;
• identifies more cut sets through exploiting additional control dependence
information;
• supports selective incremental exploration of an initial high-level FT, thus
allows users to focus their effort and gain a deeper understanding on specific
areas of interest;
• improves the precision of the results (initial and elaborated cut sets) by
automatically removing some types of inconsistent and spurious cut sets.
2. Experimental results that demonstrate some of the strengths and weaknesses of
our approach.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background
on FTA, data and control dependence, the process modeling language Little-JIL, and
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related work on variations of FTs and other automated FT construction work. Chap-
ter 3 describes our two-phase approach based on data and control flow analyses. This
chapter focuses on the FT derivation for the two phases, the removal of spurious cut
sets, and the generation of scenarios. The discussion in this chapter is independent of
the system modeling language used. Chapter 4 shows the evaluation of our approach
using four systems modeled in Little-JIL. Finally, Chapter 5 presents our conclusions
and discusses potential future work.
4
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The first section of this chapter presents a brief history of Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) and an introduction to elements of a fault tree (FT). Since our FT derivation
builds upon data and control flow analyses, the second and third sections provide
the necessary background of those areas. The forth section describes the Little-JIL
process definition language. And the last section discusses FTA-related work.
2.1 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was first developed in 1962 at Bell Laboratories by
H.A. Watson in a contract with US Air Force to study the Minuteman Launch Con-
trol System. Since then the value of FTA has been well recognized and FTA has been
adopted by various industries, such as aerospace, nuclear power, chemical processing
and automotive [12]; and more recently FTA has been used in health care and se-
curity [3, 16, 32]. Lately, it has been adopted experimentally in reasoning about the
possibility of failures in election processes [25,28].
FTA is a deductive, top-down analytical technique that begins with a specification
of an undesired event representing a system failure. “The launch vehicle fails to ignite
at launch” and “no propellant is supplied to the thruster when the arming command
is initiated” are two examples of system failures from the aerospace industry [30].
With FTA, one first postulates the possibility of a particular system failure, and
then attempts to find out which events in the system could combine to cause the
actual occurrence of the failure, represented by an undesired event. Given the un-
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Figure 2.1. Fault Tree Example.
desired event, FTA produces a fault tree (FT), a graphical model of all the various
combinations of events that could lead to the undesired event.
Events and gates are the basic elements of a FT. The event at the root (top) of
the tree is the undesired event, hereafter referred to as the top event. The logical
relationships of the events are shown by gates. A gate connects one or more input
events (typically drawn below the gate) to a single output event (typically drawn
above the gate); the gate is called the input gate of the output event. In a FT, the
primary events are the causal basic events; they are at the bottom of the tree and
are not further developed; they do not have input gates. On the other hand, the
intermediate events, including the top event, are events that have input gates.
Figure 2.1 shows an example of a FT with the top event A, intermediate events
B and C, and primary events D, E, F , G and H.
We consider two types of gates:
• AND gates specify that the output event occurs only if all input events occur
(inputs are assumed to be independent), e.g., in Figure 2.1, B occurs only if
both E and F occur.
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Figure 2.2. Fault Tree’s Compact vs. Fully Expanded Representation.
• OR gates specify that the output event occurs only if at least one of the input
events occurs, e.g., in Figure 2.1, A occurs only if at least B or C or D occurs.
It is not uncommon to see an event being a contributing cause of more than one
other event. For example, in Figure 2.2(A), we see that the event F is an input
event of B’s input gate; F is also an input event of C’s input gate. We can compactly
represent the FT as shown in Figure 2.2(B). In this compact representation, the FT is
not really a tree as defined traditionally where there is exactly one path from the root
to any vertex. While the compact graph representation is smaller in size, it produces
the same cut sets as its fully expanded counterpart does. Therefore we choose the
compact graph representation and still use the term fault tree.
Once a FT is constructed, its cut sets and minimal cut sets can be computed using
Boolean algebra. A cut set is a set of primary events whose occurrence together could
cause the top event to occur. A cut set is considered minimal if, when any of its events
is removed from the set, the resulting set is no longer a cut set. To compute cut sets
from a FT, each gate in the FT is first translated into a Boolean equation. Consider
the FT example in Figure 2.2(B), the Boolean equations are shown as follows.
• A’s input gate: A = B + C + D
7
• B’s input gate: B = E · F
• C’s input gate: C = F + G + H
Given these equations, we can apply Boolean algebra to get rid of all intermediate
events, except for the top event, and obtain an equation whose left hand side is the top
event and the right hand side is a formula of primary events in Conjunctive Normal
Form. Each clause in this formula corresponds to a cut set, which contains all events
in that clause. The final equation computed for the example FT in Figure 2.2(B) is
A = E · F + F + G + H + D.
From this equation we get five cut sets: {E,F}, {F}, {G}, {H}, and {D}. Further
Boolean “minimization” produces four minimal cut sets {F}, {G}, {H}, and {D}.
The cut set {E,F} is not minimal because removing E from it, we have {F} which
is also a cut set.
A cut set indicates a potential system vulnerability, which might be a flaw or
weakness in the system’s design, implementation, or operation and management,
that could potentially allow a system failure to occur. A cut set with one element
represents a single point of failure. The probability of a system failure occurring could
be calculated if sufficient information about the probabilities of events in the cut sets
is available.
In our approach, we analyze systems that can be modeled as control flow graphs
(CFGs) annotated with data flow information. We define this modeling formalism
more precisely in the next section (Section 2.2). With system models of this type,
we target system failures that can be characterized as the arrival of an incorrect,
unsuitable data value as an input to a particularly critical vertex on the CFG or as
the production of an incorrect data value as an output of a vertex. Some examples
of such failures are “the wrong type of blood is transfused to a patient”, or “the
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voter casts votes using an incorrect type of ballot”. And while minimal cut sets
have traditionally been used to obtain an estimate of reliability for complex systems,
we also pay attention to cut sets (i.e., not necessarily minimal) because we want to
present to users all possible scenarios about how the failure could arise.
2.2 Data Dependence
Our FTA approach builds upon data and control dependence information. To
define data dependence, we first introduce the Reaching Definitions Problem in this
section. The Reaching Definitions Problem is used as a basis for our Immediate Data
Dependence Problem, described later in Section 3.2. Even though the discussions
in this background section are about computer programs, they are applied to any
systems, including processes that involve human participants, that can be presented
by control flow graphs.
The Reaching Definitions Problem
The Reaching Definitions Problem introduced by Allen [1] is a well-known data
flow problem to answer the question: which variable definitions reach a given point
in a program?
A program is represented by a control flow graph (CFG). A CFG is a directed
and connected graph G = (V,E, start, end), where V is the set of vertices, E is the
set of edges, start is the single entry vertex, and end is the single exit vertex. For
any vertex v in V there exists a path from start to v and from v to end. Each
vertex represents a program unit (which could be a statement, a block of code, or
a procedure, depending on the desired level of granularity of analysis). As with a
typical graph structure, associated with each vertex v there are the sets Pred(v), and
Succ(v), which include the immediate predecessor and immediate successor vertices
of v respectively. To annotate the CFG with data flow information, for each vertex v,
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let Def (v) and Use(v) be the sets that include the variables defined and referenced
at v respectively. Let Σ be the set of all variables in the program.
In the CFG representation of the program, we assume that a vertex v with more
than one successor has predicates associated with its outgoing edges. An edge that
has a predicate associated with it is called a guarded edge. Let (u→ v) denote an edge
from vertex u to vertex v in the CFG. If (u → v) is a guarded edge, we use p(u, v)
to denote the predicate on that edge. Readers might be familiar with CFGs that
have decision vertices represented as diamond shapes; each decision vertex has two
outgoing edges, one labeled T and one labeled F (e.g., the vertex c1 in Figure 2.3(A)
with the condition x > 0). In our CFG representation, the decision is explicitly
associated with the edges as in the example in Figure 2.3(B), we have the following
edge predicates: p(c1, s1) = x > 0, and p(c1, s2) = ¬(x > 0).
Figure 2.3. CFG With Decision Vertex (A) Converted To CFG With Edge Predi-
cates (B).
We also assume that the CFG representation does not contain loops. This restric-
tion is discussed later in section 3.2.1.
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In the Reaching Definitions Problem, for the purpose of analysis, if variable b
is defined at vertex v, a label bv is created and that label is used to represent the
definition of b at v. A definition bv reaches a program point or vertex u if bv occurs
on some path in the CFG from start to u and is not followed by any other definition
of b on this path. For every variable b, a definition bstart reaches start. If definition
bstart reaches a use of b, it suggests that b has to be an input variable to the program,
or else it is a potential use before definition.
At each vertex v, we have the following information:
The set of definitions that v generates
GEN v = {bv | b ∈ Def (v)},
and the set of definitions that v can kill (i.e. redefine)
KILLv = {bu | b ∈ Def (v), u ∈ V }.
We use IN v to denote the set of definitions that reach v on some path through the
CFG, and OUT v to denote the set of definitions available right after v is executed.
Intuitively, OUT v contains the definitions that either are generated at v or reach v
and are not redefined at v.
IN v =

{bstart | b ∈ Σ} if v = start⋃
u∈Pred(v)
OUT u otherwise
OUT v = GEN v ∪
(
IN v \KILLv
)
The computation of IN v and OUT v is shown below.
In the terms described by Kildall [17], Reaching Definitions is an instance of a
distributive data flow framework defined by:
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• The semi-lattice (L,∧) in which
– L, the domain of values, consists of all subsets of the set of definitions; and
– ∧, the binary meet operation, is set union ∪. Consequently, the partial
ordering on L is the set containment ⊇.
• The transfer function, f : V × L→ L
f(v, x) = GEN v ∪
(
x \KILLv
)
that has the homomorphism property (also called the distributivity property)
f(v, x) ∧ f(v, y) = GEN v ∪ (x \KILLv) ∪GEN v ∪ (y \KILLv)
= GEN v ∪ ((x ∪ y) \KILLv)
= f(v, x ∧ y)
Kildall provides an iterative algorithm, which he calls a “global analysis algo-
rithm”, that starts with an approximation and iteratively updates the “current ap-
proximate pool of optimizing information” associated with each vertex until no more
changes can be made. Kildall shows that the algorithm applied to a distributive data
flow analysis framework yields a unique maximal fixed point solution, independent
of the order in which vertices are visited. Cooper [11] gave a more efficient yet easy
to understand work-list algorithm by focusing the iteration on regions in the graph
where information is changing. The algorithm begins by initializing the sets at all
vertices and constructing an initial work-list. It then repeats the process of removing
a vertex from the work-list and updating its data-flow information. If the update
changes the data-flow information at the vertex, then all of the vertices that depend
on the changed information are added to the work-list.
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The work-list approach for the Reaching Definitions Problem is shown in Algo-
rithm 2.1, starting with the “approximation” (IN v = ∅ for all v 6= start, IN start =
{bstart | b ∈ Σ}) and converging to the maximal fixed point solution.
input : CFG, GEN, KILL
output: IN, OUT
foreach v 6= start do
// initialize OUT on the assumption IN(v) = ∅ for all v
OUTv ←− GENv;
INstart ←− {bstart | b ∈ Σ};
worklist ←− {start } ;
while worklist is not empty do
Remove vertex v from worklist;
// Recompute the sets at vertex v
INv ←−
⋃
u∈Pred(v)
OUTu;
oldOUT ←− OUTv;
OUTv ←− GENv ∪
(
INv \ KILLv
)
;
if OUT(v) 6= oldOUT then
// recompute the IN and OUT sets for successors of v
Add each successors of v to worklist;
Algorithm 2.1: Compute Reaching Definitions.
Once the IN and OUT sets converge to the maximal fixed point solution, the
definitions reaching vertex v are:
REACH (v) = IN v.
If bu ∈ REACH (v) then v is said to be data flow dependent on u [18].
Example:
In Figure 2.4, x is defined at vertex 1 and vertex 7 , and it is used at vertex 8
to define z. Vertices 2 and 3 define Boolean variables p and q respectively. There is
another variable y defined at vertex 6. The edges (2 → 3), (2 → 7), (3 → 4), and
(3→ 5) are guarded with predicates p, ¬p, q, and ¬q respectively. In the figure, each
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Figure 2.4. CFG Showing Reaching Definitions.
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processing IN OUT work-list
start
{pstart, qstart,
xstart, ystart, zstart}
{pstart, qstart,
xstart, ystart, zstart} 1
1
{pstart, qstart,
xstart, ystart, zstart}
{x1, pstart, qstart,
ystart, zstart} 2
2
{x1, pstart, qstart,
ystart, zstart}
{x1, p2, qstart,
ystart, zstart} 3,7
3
{x1, p2, qstart,
ystart, zstart}
{x1, p2, q3,
ystart, zstart} 7,4,5
7
{x1, p2, qstart,
ystart, zstart}
{x7, p2, qstart,
ystart, zstart} 4,5,8
4
{x1, p2, q3,
ystart, zstart}
{x1, p2, q3,
ystart, zstart} 5,8,6
5
{x1, p2, q3,
ystart, zstart}
{x1, p2, q3,
ystart, zstart} 8,6
8
{x7, p2, qstart,
ystart, zstart}
{x7, p2, z8,
qstart, ystart} 6
6
{x1, p2, q3,
ystart, zstart}
{x1, p2, q3,
y6, zstart} 8
8
{x1, p2, q3,
y6, x7, qstart
ystart, zstart}
{z8, x1, x7, p2,
q3, qstart, y6, ystart}
Table 2.1. Reaching Definitions Example. Showing the progress of the work-list
algorithm.
CFG vertex is annotated with two sets on two lines: on the first line is the IN set of
the vertex, and on the second line is the OUT set. Table 2.1 shows the progress of
repeatedly updating the IN and OUT sets until reaching a fixed point.
2.3 Control Dependence
We use control dependence information in deriving FTs. This section describes
the necessary background information about control dependence.
• A vertex v is said to post-dominate a vertex t if all paths to the end vertex of
the CFG starting at t must go through v.
• A vertex v is said to be control dependent on an edge (u→ t) if
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1. v post-dominates t, and
2. v does not post-dominate u.
Intuitively, this means that if the control flows from u to t along (u→ t), it will
eventually reach v; however, the control may reach end from u without passing
through v. Thus, u is a “decision-point” that influences the execution of v.
The Control Dependence Problem has been well studied in the literature. There are
different algorithms to compute the control dependence relation. Ferrante et al. [13]
provide an algorithm to compute control dependence given the post-dominator tree
of the CFG. The post-dominator tree in a CFG is the dominator tree in the reverse
CFG.
The reverse CFG of a CFG G = (V,E, start, end) is a graph G′ = (V,E ′, end, start).
The two graphs G and G′ have the same set of vertices V , however, in the reverse
CFG, end is the entry vertex and start is the exit vertex, and all the edges are
reversed, i.e. (u → v) ∈ E ⇐⇒ (v → u) ∈ E ′ for all u and v such that u 6= start
and v 6= end. Besides the reversed edges, an auxiliary edge (end→ start) is added
to the reverse CFG.
Next we show how to compute the dominator tree of any CFG. To compute
the post-dominator tree of a CFG, one just has to compute the dominator tree for
its reverse CFG. Note that, in this section, we do not require a CFG to have the
requirements about edge predicates as stated in the previous section. The notion of
control dependence do not depend on edge predicates.
Computing the dominator tree of a CFG G = (V,E, start, end)
A vertex u is said to dominate a vertex v if all paths from start of the CFG to v
must go through u.
u is said to strictly dominate v if u dominates v and u does not equal v.
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The immediate dominator or idom of a vertex v is the unique vertex that strictly
dominates v but does not strictly dominate any other vertex that strictly dominates
v. Every vertex, except start, has a unique immediate dominator.
A dominator tree is a directed graph where each edge (u → v) means that u
immediately dominates v. Because each vertex has a unique immediate dominator,
that directed graph is a tree. The start vertex is the root of the tree.
The set of dominators of a vertex v, denoted Domv, is given by the solution to
the following set of equations:
Domv =
( ⋂
u∈Pred(v)
Domu
)
∪ {v}.
In fact, the problem of computing the relation Dom, called the Dominators prob-
lem, is another instance of a distributive data-flow analysis framework mentioned
above, defined by
• The semi-lattice (L,∧) where
– L, the set of values to be propagated, is the power set of vertices in the
CFG,
– ∧, the meet operator, is set intersection ∩.
• The distributive transfer function f : V × L→ L is f(v, x) = x ∪ {v}.
The dominator of the start vertex is the start vertex itself. The set of dominators
for any other vertex v is the intersection of the sets of dominators for all predecessors
u of v. The vertex v is also in the set of dominators for v. Algorithm 2.2 shows the
algorithm, essentially adapted from Kildall’s [17]. As shown above, this algorithm
when terminates provides the maximal fixed point solution for Dominators.
Once the full dominance relation is computed, we build the dominator tree top-
down with the root as the start vertex as shown in Algorithm 2.3.
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input : CFG
output: Dom relation
// Dominator of the start vertex is the start itself
Domstart ← {start}; // For all other vertices, set all vertices as the
dominators
foreach v 6= start do
Domv ← V;
// Iteratively eliminate vertices that are not dominators
while there are still changes in any Domv do
foreach v 6= start do
Domv ←
( ⋂
u∈Pred(v)
Domu
) ∪ {v};
Algorithm 2.2: Compute dominance relation Dom.
Procedure buildSubTree(v,R)
// v is the vertex being processed,
// R is the remained vertices
foreach r ∈ R do
Remove v from Dom(r);
if r is then dominated only by itself then
Add r as a child to v;
Remove r from R;
foreach r just added as a child to v do
buildSubTree(r,R);
Procedure buildDomTree()
buildSubTree(start, V);
Algorithm 2.3: Compute dominator tree.
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Figure 2.5, on the left hand side, shows the reverse CFG of the original CFG in
Figure 2.4, augmented with an edge from end to start. The reverse CFG is annotated
with the Dom set for each vertex. On the right hand side, Figure 2.5 shows the
dominator tree for that reverse CFG, so in fact, the tree is the post-dominator tree
of the original CFG.
Figure 2.5. Reverse CFG And Its Corresponding Dominator Tree.
Computing Control Dependence
Given the post-dominator tree, we can determine control dependence by examining
certain CFG edges. Let S consist of all edges (u → v) in the CFG such that v is
not an ancestor of u in the post-dominator tree (i.e., v does not post-dominate u).
We note that each (u → v) in S is a guarded edge. Let w denote the least common
ancestor of u and v in the post-dominator tree. Ferrante et al. [13] show that all
19
vertices in the post-dominator tree on the path from w to v, including v but not w
are control dependent on the edge (u→ v).
In our example, S = {(2 → 3), (2 → 7), (3 → 4), (3 → 5)}. Table 2.2 shows the
control dependence relation.
Edge Least Common Ancestor
Control dependent
vertices
(2→ 3) 8 6,3
(2→ 7) 8 7
(3→ 4) 6 4
(3→ 5) 6 5
Table 2.2. Control Dependence Example.
2.4 The Process Modeling Language Little-JIL
We implement and evaluate our approach by applying it to models of four real-
world human-intensive systems from the medical and election domains. These models
are defined in Little-JIL, a process modeling language. Therefore, this section provides
an introduction to Little-JIL. Details about the language can be found in [33].
Little-JIL is used to model processes. A process informally is a sequences of
tasks carried out to achieve a certain outcome. Each Little-JIL process model carries
control and data flow information, therefore they are suitable to be used as system
models in our approach. As mentioned earlier, we use the terms process and system
interchangeably.
Little-JIL represents a process as a hierarchy of steps carried out by agents that
may be humans, hardware devices, or software applications. A Little-JIL model
consists of activity diagrams showing the hierarchical decomposition of steps, a spec-
ification of the artifacts manipulated by the steps, and a specification of the agents
and resources needed to perform the steps.
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A step is the basic building block of Little-JIL models. A Little-JIL step is a
specification of a unit of work assigned to an agent in the process. A step may be
decomposed into sub-steps (children). A leaf step has no sub-steps and its behavior
depends entirely on its assigned agent. A non-leaf step’s behavior consists of the
behaviors of its sub-steps and their order of execution. Every Little-JIL process
model has a root step that represents the entire process. This step is decomposed as
far as necessary to describe the process.
For example, a model reflecting the election process used by Yolo County, Califor-
nia1 consists of the root step “conduct election”, which is decomposed into sub-steps
representing activities such as the preparations made before the election day, the con-
duct of the election at a single precinct, the counting of ballots, and the post-election
canvass. These sub-steps in turn are decomposed into steps at a more specific level
of detail.
Figure 2.6 shows the part of the elaboration of “issue ballot and get vote”—one of
the steps in the Yolo County election process. Voters are checked for their eligibility
before being issued a ballot. If the voter is verified as eligible, a regular ballot is issued,
otherwise a provisional ballot (which is not examined unless the election is close) is
issued. In the Little-JIL model, the step “issue ballot and get vote” has two sub-
steps, namely “issue ballot” and “cast vote”. The sub-steps are executed sequentially
(denoted by the blue arrow → on the step bar). The step “issue ballot” in turn has
three sub-steps, “verify registered”, “verify not-voted” and “issue regular”, which are
also executed sequentially.
Each step may contain a specification for pre-requisites that must be satisfied
before an agent can begin the work and post-requisites to check that the work was
completed correctly (not present in this example).
1http://www.yoloelections.org/
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input:  
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    votingRoll 
exception:  
    VoterNotRegistered 
input:  
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    votingRoll 
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output: 
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output: 
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Figure 2.6. Little-JIL Process Model Of “Issue ballot and get vote”.
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The execution of a Little-JIL step is modeled as a progress through several states.
Step execution begins in the POSTED state during which the execution of the step is as-
signed to an agent. The execution then proceeds to the STARTED state when the agent
begins performing the step. Eventually the step enters either the COMPLETED state
(normal execution) or the TERMINATED state (the execution ends with an exception).
A step may also specify how to handle exceptions that are reported during the
execution of its descendant steps. An exception handler can be a Little-JIL step that
is capable of defining an arbitrarily complex response to an exception, or can be a
simple handler that specifies only how execution should continue after the occur-
rence of the exception. In the example in Figure 2.6, the steps “verify registered”
and “verify not-voted” might throw exceptions of types VoterNotRegistered and
AlreadyVoted respectively; the red cross × on the “issue ballot” step bar connects
to the “issue provisional” step that handles VoterNotRegistered exceptions; the red
cross × also connects to a reference of “issue provisional” (similar to invoking a prede-
fined procedure in a procedural programming language) which handles AlreadyVoted
exceptions. In this example, the handlers are specified so that the sub-steps throwing
the exception will be terminated, the handlers are executed and the process execution
moves to the COMPLETED state of “issue ballot”.
Each Little-JIL step has an artifact declaration that defines the artifacts it is
accessing or providing. Artifacts are generally passed through the coordination hier-
archy between steps and their sub-steps. For example, the ballot artifact is output
from the step “issue regular” to its parent step “issue ballot”; so is the ballot artifact
output from the step “issue provisional”. The voterName and votingRoll artifacts
are input into the step “issue ballot” from its parent “issue balot and cast vote”,
then passed down from “issue ballot” to its sub-steps “verify registered” and “verify
not-voted”.
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A Little-JIL process model also includes agent specifications. Each step specifies
the kind of agent that is to be assigned to the step to be responsible for the execution
of that step2.
Little-JIL has been used to model different processes for different purposes. Con-
boy et al. [10] used a Little-JIL process model as the underlying model for a smart
checklist to mitigate the risk of stroke in cardiac surgeries. Many different anal-
yses have been performed on Little-JIL process models, namely finite state verifi-
cation [3, 29], online deviation detection [5], resource scheduling [27], automatic re-
quirement derivation [9], automatic failure mode and effect analysis [31], fault tree
analysis [3, 25], etc.
Given a Little-JIL process model, we can generate an appropriate CFG to be
used in our FTA approach. Section 4.1.1 describes how to generate a CFG from a
Little-JIL process model.
2.5 Related Work
This section discusses related work including the variations of FTs and what they
are used for, and the various approaches to automatic FT construction.
2.5.1 Variations of Fault Trees
Attack trees, introduced by Schneider [26] are similar to fault trees in the sense
that they are both hierarchical logic diagrams in which one event is represented as
a logical combination of lower-level events. Moore et al. [23] used attack trees and
attack patterns to model attacks for the purpose of documentation. Lazarus [20]
created a catalog of election attacks in the form of a single attack tree, attempting to
2Note that, while “cast vote” is a leaf step performed by an agent of type Voter, the step “issue
ballot” is not a leaf step, it composes of sub-steps which can be performed by the same or different
agent of type ElectionOfficial. The agent specification is not modeled in this example.
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provide a threat model and a quantitative threat evaluation that are reusable across
different jurisdictions.
Helmer et al. [15] used augmented Software Fault Trees (SFTs), attack trees with
temporal order, to model intrusions. In their models, the root node represents the
intrusion and a minimal cut set contains events to be monitored to detect intrusions.
Their SFTs are then automatically converted to colored Petri nets for intrusion de-
tection systems.
2.5.2 Other Automated Fault Tree Generation Work
Many software tools, commercial as well as open-source, facilitate the manual
construction of FTs. When FTs become large, which they typically do, manual
construction, even with such tool support, may be error-prone and time-consuming.
There have been attempts to generate FTs automatically, for example from source
code written in programming languages. In [21], Leveson et al. proposed to use FTs
to guide analysts to identify errors that cause an Ada program to produce incorrect
outputs. The incorrect output is represented as the FT’s top event. Templates, one
for each kind of Ada statement, are used to elaborate immediate events to construct
the full FT. Friedman [14] also developed a template-based tool to construct FTs
given a Pascal program and a software-caused failure (post condition).
In [24], Pai and Bechta showed an algorithm to automatically derive FTs from
UML models. They pointed out that the disadvantage of their approach is the semi-
formal nature of UML. Because of UML’s ambiguous semantics, their FTs whose
derivation is based on one interpretation of the semantics, might be incorrect.
Zhao and Petriu [34] also generated FTs from UML models. They used a rule-
based transformation language ATL and created rules to map elements of UML mod-
els (sequence diagrams, use case diagrams, and composite structure diagrams) to
elements of FTs. Their top events, as well as other events in their FTs, are simply
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“X fails”, where X could be the whole system, a hardware component, a software
component, or a use case. Our approach considers more types of events that involve
data and hardware/software/human behaviors.
Lauer et al. [19] synthesized FTs from different types of UML models (soft-
ware/hardware architecture diagrams and application models built on top of those
architectures). They focused on the separation of application independent and appli-
cation dependent views of the system. They claimed that in doing so various different
system concepts could be investigated with minimal re-modeling effort, thus could be
used at the early design stages.
In [22] Mhenni et al. presented a methodology to automatically generate FTs
from SysML system models. They represented a SysML Internal Block Diagram
(IBD) as a directed multi-graph, then used a graph traversal algorithm and identified
block design patterns in the IBD to generate sub-FTs and combined them all into a
generic FT. To produce a specific FT for an undesired top event, information from
separate FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) was used to refine the generic FT.
Our approach starts from the top event, then traverse backward on the system’s flow
graph to identify errors, so the derived FT is specific for the given top event; we do not
generate a generic FT. Also, our approach exploits control flow information in system
models to construct FTs; their SysML IBDs provide only data flow information.
All of these approaches to automatic FT construction [19,22,24,34] target system
models of types different from what our approach does. Our approach targets system
models that are control flow graphs with data flow information so that we can exploit
the data and control dependence to generate FTs.
Closest to our approach, and what our work is built upon, is the FTA by Chen
et al. [3, 4]. They developed a framework that supports the automatic derivation
of FTs from rigorously defined process models. In that framework, templates are
used to elaborate FT events. More templates can be added to allow new types of
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events. Given the specification of an undesired event representing a process failure,
they use control and data flows to trace back through the process model to identify
the original causes that could lead to the failure. They implemented and evaluated
the framework for processes modeled in Little-JIL. We already described the language
in the previous section of this chapter. Our approach is also template-based, and we
also evaluate our approach by applying it to processes modeled in Little-JIL. Their
approach, however, does not fully consider control dependence information and thus
fails to recognize certain causes of failures in a process model. In our approach, we
exploit both data and control dependence to construct FTs. In addition, they claimed
that their approach was generic and applicable to any process definition languages
as long as they incorporate sufficient data and control flow information, but they
only showed how the approach worked for Little-JIL. We explicitly show that our
approach is generic in the sense that it works on CFGs and most languages, including
Little-JIL, can be translated to CFG.
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CHAPTER 3
APPROACH
In this chapter, we present our approach to identifying possible causes of potential
system failures using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). This approach is incremental; it
allows users to selectively explore possible causes by initially presenting the users
with cut sets for a high-level, and thus smaller, fault tree (FT); the users can then
select one cut set for more detailed analysis, culminating in elaborated cut sets and
concrete scenarios which show how events in an elaborated cut set could lead to the
specified system failure. Our approach also attempts to produce precise results by
automatically eliminating some inconsistent and spurious cut sets.
The organization of this chapter is as follows:
• Section 3.1 presents the overall architecture of the approach.
• Section 3.2 shows the simple templates used in the first phase of analysis to
derive the initial FT.
• Section 3.3 describes the first phase of the approach by applying it to a small
model of an “Issue ballot and get vote” system. The section shows the derivation
of the initial FT and then shows the need for incremental selective exploration
of the FT’s cut sets. This example “Issue ballot and get vote” is used in the
following sections to keep illustrating the approach.
• Section 3.4 presents how to extract the part of the initial FT that focuses on a
selected cut set.
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• Section 3.5 describes the detailed templates used in the second phase of analysis
to derive the elaborated FT that focuses on the selected cut set.
• Section 3.6 shows the elimination of inconsistent and spurious cut sets.
• Finally, section 3.7 explains the generation of concrete scenarios.
3.1 The Overall Approach
In this work, as mentioned in section 2.1, a system failure is defined to be an
input or output variable of a specific vertex in the system’s control flow graph (CFG)
receiving an incorrect value. Predefined templates exploit the system’s control and
data flows to trace back through the CFG to identify the causes that could lead to the
specified failure. Starting from the top event that represents the system failure, the
templates are applied iteratively to develop intermediate events until all intermediate
events have been fully developed, resulting in a FT whose leaves are all primary
events. The templates are categorized into simple and detailed templates. The simple
templates are used to derive a FT at the high level, called the initial FT. It is only
when users select a specific cut set from the initial FT that the detailed templates
are used to produce an elaborated FT, as described later in this chapter.
Figure 3.1 shows the overall approach. First, given the system model and the
undesired event representing the system failure, simple templates (section 3.2) are
used to derive the initial FT and then the initial cut sets from the initial FT are
automatically computed. In this phase of analysis, we only consider single errors
and do not consider combinations of errors. For example, a system execution unit’s1
output being incorrect could be caused by its input being incorrect (data dependence),
or the execution incorrectly reaching the unit (control dependence), or the unit being
1A system execution unit corresponds to a vertex in the system’s CFG.
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Figure 3.1. The Incremental Approach.
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performed incorrectly, or any combination of those three reasons. In this phase, error
combinations are not considered.
Once the initial cut sets are computed from the initial FT, users can select one
cut set to focus on. This approach allows users to zoom in on a specific cut set by:
• creating a projection of the initial FT, called the focused FT, that keeps only
events relevant to this initial cut set (section 3.4);
• elaborating the focused FT using detailed templates to derive a more detailed
FT, called elaborated FT, which focuses on the chosen initial cut set (sec-
tion 3.5); and then
• automatically computing the cut sets of the elaborated FT, called the elaborated
cut sets. When computing cut sets for the initial FT as well as the elaborated
FT, we automatically identify some inconsistent and spurious cut sets and re-
move them from the result (section 3.6).
Users can then select one of the elaborated cut sets to explore even further. We
generate concrete scenarios that show the ways that the events in the chosen elabo-
rated cut set can occur and how they can then lead to the top event (section 3.7).
The next section presents the simple templates used in the first phase of this
approach.
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3.2 Deriving Initial Fault Trees Using Simple Templates
Based on data and control dependence information, we develop simple templates
that can be used in the first phase of the analysis to derive the initial FT. Section
3.2.1 presents such templates which are called the DF templates. This work builds
upon the FTA Framework by Bin Chen [3], in which he also developed templates for
deriving FTs for Little-JIL process models. To leverage the existing implementations
by Chen, we decide to “re-use” some of the templates made by Chen, but generalize
them so that they are independent of system modeling languages. These templates
are called the SP templates and are described in section 3.2.2. The proof that the
two template sets, DF and SP, are equivalent is presented in Appendix A.
3.2.1 DF Set: Templates To Derive Initial Fault Trees Based On Data
Flow Analysis
Data flow dependence, in the form of Reaching Definitions, and control dependence
are described in the Background Chapter (sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively). To derive
FTs in our approach, we need extra information, therefore we extend the Reaching
Definitions Problem to the Path-sensitive Reaching Definitions Problem (PRDP) to
answer the question: which variable definitions reach a given point (vertex) in a
system’s CFG, and which paths do the definitions take to reach that point? In this
section, we first describe the PRDP, and we then show how the data dependence
information derived by solving PRDP, together with control dependence information,
are used to develop the DF Template Set.
3.2.1.1 Path-sensitive Reaching Definitions Problem (PRDP) And Im-
mediate Data Dependence
First of all, we require CFGs to be acyclic, i.e., containing no loops. A CFG
that contains loops has an infinite number of paths. Our FT construction method
constructs events in the FT by walking along paths in the CFG; so a CFG with
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infinitely many paths could result in a FT with infinitely many events. To deal with
loops, techniques such as unrolling to a given bound can be used.
As mentioned in the background section 2.2, the function Use : V → P(Σ)) asso-
ciates to each vertex the set of variables referenced at the vertex. We now extend the
domain of the function to include the edge predicates such that, Use(p(u, v)) is the set
of all variables referenced by the predicate p(u, v). In the example in Figure 2.3(B),
there are the following edge predicates: p(c1, s1) = x > 0, and p(c1, s2) = ¬(x > 0).
Therefore, Use(p(c1, s1)) = Use(p(c1, s2)) = {x}.
A vertex in the CFG might have multiple inputs and outputs, but not every output
is dependent on or influenced by all of the inputs. In such cases, a CFG can always
be normalized so that each vertex has at most one output and zero or more inputs,
and if the vertex has an output, that output is a function of all of the inputs.
Let P be the set of paths in the CFG G = (V,E, start, end). Each path P in P
is a sequence of vertices 〈v1, v2, ..., vn〉 with n ≥ 1 such that, for all i with 1 ≤ i < n,
there is an edge from vi to vi+1.
The set of path-sensitive definitions is
D = {(b, 〈v1, v2, ..., vn〉) | b ∈ Σ, 〈v1, v2, ..., vn〉 ∈ P , b ∈ Def (v1), b /∈ Def (vi), 1 < i ≤ n}.
Each element (b, 〈v1, v2, ..., vn〉) of D implies that b is defined at v1 and might be
propagated to vn via 〈v1, v2, ..., vn〉 which is a definition-clear path with respect to b.
Since we assume the CFG is acyclic and Σ is finite, we can see that D is also finite.
At each vertex v in the CFG, GEN v is the set of path-sensitive definitions gener-
ated by v
GEN v = {(b, 〈v〉) | b ∈ Def (v)},
and KILLv is the set of path-sensitive definitions that v might kill
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KILLv = {(b, P ) | b ∈ Def (v), P ∈ P}.
To solve the PRDP to answer the question “which variable definitions reach a
given point (vertex) in a system’s CFG, and which paths do the definitions take
to reach that point”, we employ Cooper’s work-list algorithm as in the traditional
Reaching Definitions Problem, but with the following IN and OUT sets:
• IN v contains the path-sensitive definitions that reach v:
IN v =

{(b, 〈start〉) | b ∈ Σ} if v = start⋃
x∈OUTu,u∈Pred(v)
g(v, x) otherwise
in which function g : V ×D −→ P(D) is defined as follows:
g(v, b, 〈v1, v2, ..., vn〉) =

{(b, 〈v1, v2, ..., vn, v〉)} if (vn → v) ∈ E
{} otherwise.
• OUT v contains the path-sensitive definitions that are available after the execu-
tion of v:
OUT v = GENv ∪ (IN v \KILLv).
We can see that the PRDP problem is also an instance of a distributive data-flow
framework with the semi-lattice (P(D),∪) and the transfer function f : V ×P(D) −→
P(D) as follows:
f(v,X) = GEN v ∪
(⋃
x∈X
g(v, x) \KILLv
)
.
It’s easy to see that f is distributive:
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f(v,X ∪ Y ) = f(v,X) ∪ f(v, Y ).
Therefore, Cooper’s work-list algorithm [11], which essentially is the Kildall’s it-
erative algorithm [17]2, applied to the PRDP problem, is guaranteed to produce the
unique maximal fixed point solution where the IN and OUT sets for each vertex
converge. At that point, the IN v set contains the path-sensitive definitions that can
reach v.
Example:
Figure 3.2. CFG Showing Path-sensitive Reaching Definitions.
2Both are mentioned in the Background section 2.2.
35
We use the same CFG example as described in the background section 2.2 but this
time we will show the Path-sensitive Reaching Definitions information. In this CFG
(Figure 3.2), Σ = {p, q, x, y, z}, x is defined at vertex 1 and vertex 7 , and it is used
at vertex 8 to define z. Vertices 2 and 3 define Boolean variables p and q respectively.
There is another variable y defined at vertex 6. The edges (2→ 3), (2→ 7), (3→ 4),
and (3→ 5) are guarded with predicates p, ¬p, q, and ¬q respectively. In the figure,
each CFG vertex is annotated with two sets on two lines: on the first line is the IN
set of the vertex, and on the second line is the OUT set.
Table 3.1 shows the progress of iteratively updating the IN and OUT sets until
they converge. Below are some noteworthy example iterations:
• Showing the computation of IN v: Suppose we want to process vertex 1 , whose
immediate predecessor is start, and we already have
OUT start = {(b, 〈start〉) | b ∈ Σ}
from previous processing. Therefore, IN 1 = {(b, 〈start, 1〉) | b ∈ Σ}.
• Showing the computation of IN v: Suppose we want to process vertex 6 whose
immediate predecessors are 4 and 5, and we already have (x, 〈1, 2, 3, 4〉) ∈ OUT 4
and (x, 〈1, 2, 3, 5〉) ∈ OUT 5. So the definitions coming into vertex 6 are both
x being defined at vertex 1 through different paths, one through the path
〈1, 2, 3, 4〉, and one through the path 〈1, 2, 3, 5〉. We do not combine these two;
we keep them separately so that the end results really show different ways a defi-
nition can reach a vertex. Therefore, both (x, 〈1, 2, 3, 4, 6〉) and (x, 〈1, 2, 3, 5, 6〉)
are elements of IN 6.
• Showing the computation of OUT v: Have a look at vertex 7,
IN 7 = {(x, 〈1, 2, 7〉), (p, 〈2, 7〉)} ∪ {(b, 〈start, 1, 2, 7〉) | b ∈ Σ, b 6= x, b 6= p}
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processing IN OUT work-list
start
{(p, 〈start〉), (q, 〈start〉),
(x, 〈start〉), (y, 〈start〉), (z, 〈start〉)}
{(p, 〈start〉), (q, 〈start〉),
(x, 〈start〉), (y, 〈start〉), (z, 〈start〉)} 1
1
{(p, 〈start, 1〉), (q, 〈start, 1〉),
(x, 〈start, 1〉), (y, 〈start, 1〉),
(z, 〈start, 1〉)}
{(x, 〈1〉),
(p, 〈start, 1〉), (q, 〈start, 1〉),
(y, 〈start, 1〉), (z, 〈start, 1〉)}
2
2
{(x, 〈1, 2〉), (p, 〈start, 1, 2〉),
(q, 〈start, 1, 2〉), (y, 〈start, 1, 2〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2〉)}
{(p, 〈2〉), (x, 〈1, 2〉),
(q, 〈start, 1, 2〉), (y, 〈start, 1, 2〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2〉)}
3,7
3
{(p, 〈2, 3〉), (x, 〈1, 2, 3〉),
(q, 〈start, 1, 2, 3〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 3〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3〉)}
{(q, 〈3〉), (p, 〈2, 3〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 3〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3〉)}
7,4,5
7
{(p, 〈2, 7〉), (x, 〈1, 2, 7〉),
(q, 〈start, 1, 2, 7〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 7〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 7〉)}
{(x, 〈7〉), (p, 〈2, 7〉),
(q, 〈start, 1, 2, 7〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 7〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 7〉)}
4,5,8
4
{(q, 〈3, 4〉), (p, 〈2, 3, 4〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 4〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 4〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 4〉)}
{(q, 〈3, 4〉), (p, 〈2, 3, 4〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 4〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 4〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 4〉)}
5,8,6
5
{(q, 〈3, 5〉), (p, 〈2, 3, 5〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 5〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 5〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 5〉)}
{(q, 〈3, 5〉), (p, 〈2, 3, 5〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 5〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 5〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 5〉)}
8,6
8
{(x, 〈7, 8〉), (p, 〈2, 7, 8〉),
(q, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉)}
{(z, 〈8〉), (x, 〈7, 8〉),
(p, 〈2, 7, 8〉),
(q, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉)}
6
6
{(q, 〈3, 4, 6〉), (q, 〈3, 5, 6〉),
(p, 〈2, 3, 4, 6〉), (p, 〈2, 3, 5, 6〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 4, 6〉), (x, 〈1, 2, 3, 5, 6〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6〉),
(y, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6〉)}
{(y, 〈6〉),
(q, 〈3, 4, 6〉), (q, 〈3, 5, 6〉),
(p, 〈2, 3, 4, 6〉), (p, 〈2, 3, 5, 6〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 4, 6〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 5, 6〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6〉)}
8
8
{(y, 〈6, 8〉), (y, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉),
(q, 〈3, 4, 6, 8〉), (q, 〈3, 5, 6, 8〉),
(q, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉),
(p, 〈2, 7, 8〉), (p, 〈2, 3, 4, 6, 8〉),
(p, 〈2, 3, 5, 6, 8〉),
(x, 〈7, 8〉), (x, 〈1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8〉),
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8〉)
(z, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉)}
{(z, 〈8〉),
(y, 〈6, 8〉), (y, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉),
(q, 〈3, 4, 6, 8〉), (q, 〈3, 5, 6, 8〉),
(q, 〈start, 1, 2, 7, 8〉),
(p, 〈2, 7, 8〉), (p, 〈2, 3, 4, 6, 8〉),
(p, 〈2, 3, 5, 6, 8〉),
(x, 〈7, 8〉), (x, 〈1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8〉),
(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8〉),
Table 3.1. Path-sensitive Reaching Definitions Example. Showing the progress of
the work-list algorithm.
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and x is re-defined here, thus,
(x, 〈1, 2, 7〉) ∈ KILL7
GEN 7 = {(x, 〈7〉)}
∴ OUT 7 = {(x, 〈7〉), (p, 〈2, 7〉)} ∪ {(b, 〈start, 1, 2, 7〉) | b ∈ Σ, b 6= x, b 6= p}.
Immediate Data Dependence
We define the immediate data dependence of variable b at vertex v to be:
• all the definitions that reach v and are used at v to define b in case b ∈ Def (v),
or
• all the definitions of b that reach v in case b /∈ Def (v).
Instead of keeping the path information as a sequence of vertices from the vertex
where the variable is defined, we keep only the first vertex of the path and the guarded
edges along that path, which are sufficient to re-construct the path if need be. We
define a 1:1 mapping e as follows:
e : D −→ L× ω(E)
(b, 〈v1, v2, ..., vn〉) 7−→ (bv1 , 〈(vi1 → vi1+1), (vi2 → vi2+1)...(vik → vik+1)〉)
where
• L is a set of labels of the form bv with b ∈ Σ and v ∈ V ,
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• ω(E) is the set of sequences of edges,
• For all j such that, 1 ≤ j ≤ k: (vij → vij+1) is a guarded edge, and
• For all m such that, 1 ≤ m ≤ n and m /∈ {i1, i2, ..., ik}: (vm → vm+1) is NOT a
guarded edge.
Intuitively, e(b, P ) is a tuple of a definition of b at the first vertex of the path P
and the set of all the guarded edges on that path.
The immediate data dependence of variable b at vertex v is then defined formally
as follows:
IDD(b, v) =

{e(a, P ) | a ∈ Use(v), (a, P ) ∈ IN (v)} if b ∈ Def (v)
{e(b, P ) | (b, P ) ∈ IN (v)} if b /∈ Def (v)
Since we assume a vertex has at most one output, we can write IDD(v) in place
of IDD(b, v) in case b ∈ Def (v). In such cases, IDD(v) is the set of all definitions
that reach v and used at v to define the only output b.
In the above example, x is being used at 8 to define z, and
IN 8 = {(x, 〈1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8〉), (x, 〈1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8〉), (x, 〈7, 8〉), ..., (y, 〈6, 8〉), ...},
therefore IDD(z, 8) or IDD(8) = {(x1, 〈(2 → 3), (3 → 4)〉), (x1, 〈(2 → 3), (3 →
5)〉), (x7, 〈〉)} — only keep the definitions of x, and the path information includes the
vertex there x is defined and the set of guarded edges from that vertex to vertex 8.
Failure-influencing labels and variables
Let D be a binary relation over the set of labels L such that
D(au, bv)⇔ ∃P ∈ ω(E) : (au, P ) ∈ IDD(b, v).
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Informally, we say au directly influences the value of b at vertex v. The transitive
closure of D on L is the relation D+ in which D+(au, bv) denotes that au either directly
or indirectly influences the value of b at vertex v.
Recall that a system failure is defined to be an input or output variable of a
specific vertex in the system’s CFG receiving an incorrect value. For example, “b
output from v is incorrect”, or “b input to v is incorrect”. We call v the failure
vertex. If D+(au, bv), we call au a failure-influencing label and a a failure-influencing
variable.
3.2.1.2 Deriving Fault Trees using Immediate Data Dependence and Con-
trol Dependence Information
Our approach to FT construction is independent of the system modeling language
used as long as the language incorporates sufficient control and data flow information,
so that the CFG extracted from the system model complies with the requirements of
CFGs we have mentioned thus far, including having unique start and end vertices,
being acyclic, having edge predicates on outgoing edges of vertices with more than
one outgoing edges, having Def associated with each vertex, having Use associated
with each vertex and each edge predicate3.
In our approach, a system failure (top event) is specified as either an output from
a vertex being incorrect, or a variable input to a vertex being incorrect.
To derive the FT, we start with the top event as an intermediate event and repeat-
edly apply appropriate templates to elaborate intermediate events until all the leaves
of the resulting FT are primary events. Each template elaborates an intermediate
event and results in a partial FT. The intermediate event being elaborated is then
3We also assume that the checking of edge predicates are done correctly; our approach does not
consider faults caused by incorrect evaluation of edge predicates. If one wants to consider such
faults, one can add to the CFG an extra vertex whose output is the evaluation of the predicate. See
further discussion in section 3.2.1.8.
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replaced with the partial FT. Any intermediate events in the partial FT are then
elaborated using appropriate templates.
So given the CFG, the immediate data dependence, the control dependence infor-
mation, and the top event, Algorithm 3.1 is used to derive the initial FT.
input : CFG, IDD, CD, topEvent
output: FT
visitedEvents ←− {};
worklist ←− {topEvent };
while worklist is not empty do
Remove event e from worklist;
if visitedEvents does not contain e then
Add e to visitedEvents;
Find appropriate template (elaboration procedure) t for e;
partial-fault-tree ←− elaborate e using t;
Replace e with the partial-fault-tree;
foreach leaf event e′ in the partial-fault-tree do
if e′ is not a primary event then
Add e′ to worklist;
// at this point topEvent is a fully derived FT
Return topEvent;
Algorithm 3.1: FT Derivation.
As stated in the Background section 2.1, one FT event can be an input event of
different gates. In the process of elaborating immediate events using templates, we
might encounter an intermediate event that is a leaf of the partial FT from elaborating
an event e1, and it is also a leaf of the partial FT from elaborating an event e2. In
this algorithm, the intermediate event is only elaborated once thanks to the use of
the set visitedEvents.
The remainder of this section shows the simple templates to derive the initial FTs
based on the immediate data dependence and control dependence information.
3.2.1.3 Template DF-1: “b output from v is incorrect”
Let v be a vertex in the CFG, and b be an output of v, i.e., b ∈ Def (v). The value
of b output from v is considered incorrect only if any of the followings happens:
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1. Any of the inputs a into v is incorrect4, we call this a data dependence error,
2. The execution incorrectly reaches v, we call this a control dependence error,
3. The computation at v is done incorrectly, we call this an agent error.
By “the execution incorrectly reaches v”, we mean that on the execution path
from start to v, the execution takes an incorrect branch because of some error (one
of the three types mentioned above), while if taking the correct branch, the execution
might not reach v at all or the execution reaches v carrying a different input to v. Our
approach aims to identify such errors. We discuss this more fully when describing
Template DF-5 in section 3.2.1.7 below.
Figure 3.3. Template DF-1 For Event Type “b output from v is incorrect” When
b ∈ Def (v).
The FT template DF-1 in Figure 3.3 reflects the above mentioned relationship. In
that template, the event “v is performed incorrectly producing incorrect b”, depicted
by the green box, is a primary event; it is not further elaborated. In the context of
process model analysis, it can be interpreted as an agent’s error where the agent can be
a human, software, or a hardware device performing step v. The other events, “input
into v is incorrect” and “execution incorrectly reaches v” will be further elaborated
as discussed in the next sections 3.2.1.4 and 3.2.1.7 respectively.
4We assume that each vertex has at most one output and the output depends on all of the inputs.
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Algorithm B.1 in the Appendix shows the pseudo-code of the procedure to elabo-
rate the intermediate event “b output from v is incorrect”. The input is the interme-
diate event to be elaborated. The algorithm creates a new gate for the intermediate
event, elaborates the gate and produces as the result the partial fault tree according to
the template. The algorithm’s output is the list of any newly generated intermediate
events of the partial fault tree.
3.2.1.4 Template DF-2: “input to v is incorrect”
Figure 3.4. Template DF-2 For Event Type “input to v is incorrect” When b ∈
Def (v). The symbol * indicates that one event is added for each (au, P ) ∈ IDD(b, v)
and the symbol ** indicates that one event is added for each ei in the sequence
P = 〈e1, . . . , en〉.
Using immediate data dependence information, the event “input into v is incor-
rect” can be elaborated as in Template DF-2 in Figure 3.4. For each (au, P ) ∈ IDD(v),
there is one event“input a into v from u is incorrect”, which in turn is a combination
of “a is incorrect when exiting u” and all the predicates on the guarded edges of P
(guiding the control from u to v) being true. Note that here we use “a is incorrect
when exiting u” instead of “a output from u is incorrect” to take care of the cases that
u is the start vertex or a is not an output of u. Template DF-3 (see section 3.2.1.5)
is in place to take care of these different cases.
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In this elaboration, the event “predicate p on edge ei holds” is a primary event,
while the event “a is incorrect when exiting u” is an intermediate event which is
elaborated using Template DF-3 below.
Algorithm B.2 in the Appendix shows the pseudo-code of the procedure to elab-
orate the intermediate event “input into v is incorrect”.
3.2.1.5 Template DF-3: “b is incorrect when exiting v”
Figure 3.5. Template DF-3 For Event Type “b is incorrect when exiting v”.
Figure 3.5 shows the elaboration of the event type “b is incorrect when exiting v”.
It depends on whether v is the start vertex and whether b is an output of v.
• Case 1: v is the start vertex. In this case, b is defined outside of the system, it
is just an input into the system, therefore, the event “b is incorrect when exiting
v” is elaborated into the primary event “b input to the system is incorrect”5.
• Case 2: v is not the start vertex and b is an output of v. In this case, the execu-
tion of v does affect the value of b. Thus, the event “b is incorrect when exiting
v” is elaborated into the intermediate event “b output from v is incorrect”,
which can be further elaborated using Template DF-1 (see section 3.2.1.3).
5In Template DF-3, each OR gate has only one input event; it basically means the output event
occurs if the input event occurs. AND gates could also be used here since there is only one input
event. We choose to use OR gates.
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• Case 3: v is not the start vertex and b is not an output of v. In this case, the
execution of v does not affect the value of b, thus b must have been incorrect
when entering v. Thus, the event “b is incorrect when exiting v” is elaborated
into the intermediate event “b is incorrect when entering v”, which can be
further elaborated using Template DF-4 (see section 3.2.1.6).
Algorithm B.3 in the Appendix shows the pseudo-code of the procedure to elab-
orate the intermediate event “b is incorrect when exiting v”.
3.2.1.6 Template DF-4: “b is incorrect when entering v”
Figure 3.6. Template DF-4 For Event Type “b is incorrect when entering v”. The
symbol * indicates that one event is added for each (bu, P ) ∈ IDD(b, v) and the symbol
** indicates that one event is added for each ei in the sequence P = 〈e1, . . . , en〉.
In order to elaborate the event “b is incorrect when entering v”, we also use the
data dependence information IDD(b, v) as in template DF-2. Template DF-4 shown
in Figure 3.6 is essentially the same as template DF-2 shown in Figure 3.4.
Algorithm B.4 in the Appendix shows the pseudo-code of the procedure to elab-
orate the event “b is incorrect when entering v”.
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3.2.1.7 Template DF-5: “execution incorrectly reaches v”
We use the control dependence information computed for each CFG vertex v to
elaborate the event “execution incorrectly reaches v”.
Recall that CD(v) denotes the set of edges that v is control dependent on:
CD(v)
def
= {(u→ t) | v is control dependent on (u→ t)}.
So, for each (u → t) in CD(v) there are two cases that allow the execution
to incorrectly reach v from u via the edge (u → t) as shown in template DF-5 in
Figure 3.7:
1. The execution incorrectly reaches u first, and then from there reaches v through
edge (u→ t) with predicate p(u, t);
2. The value of the predicate p(u, t) deciding the path from u to v is incorrect.
Figure 3.7. Template DF-5 For Event Type “execution incorrectly reaches v”. The
Kleene star * indicates one event is added for each (u→ t) ∈ CD(v).
Algorithm B.5 in the Appendix shows the pseudo-code of the procedure to elab-
orate the intermediate event “execution incorrectly reaches v”.
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3.2.1.8 Template DF-6: “predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds”
Figure 3.8. An Example CFG Of “Issue ballot and get vote”.
Figure 3.9. Template DF-6 For Event Type “predicate p(u,t) incorrectly holds”.
The Kleene star * indicates one event is added for each a ∈ Use(p(u, t)).
We assume that in the system model, the edge predicates (on guarded edges)
always get evaluated correctly. We do not take predicate evaluations into account
as places for potential errors. If a predicate could be evaluated incorrectly, it has to
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be treated as a variable that is output from a vertex. For example, in the CFG in
Figure 2.3(B), the predicate p(c1, c1) is x > 0; we assume the evaluation of x > 0 is
always correct, thus the value of p(c1, c1) is only incorrect if x is incorrect. Another
example is in the election process as described in the Background section 2.4, to issue
an appropriate ballot (regular or provisional) the election official has to check for the
voter’s eligibility. If the voter is registered and has not marked as voted, the election
official issues a regular ballot, otherwise the election official issues a provisional ballot.
A CFG as shown in Figure 3.8 reflects such control flow. However, we assume that
the predicate evaluations are always done correctly, therefore if we use that CFG,
the errors in the predicate evaluations will not be identified. It is possible that the
election official does the check incorrectly (intentionally or not). So in order for such
error to be identified using our approach, the predicate has to be treated as output
variables (Boolean variables registered output from ‘verify register’ and notVoted
output from ‘verify not-voted’) as shown later in section 3.3.
With that assumption, we see that the predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds only if
any variable used in the predicate is incorrect. Figure 3.9 shows template DF-6 to
elaborate the event “predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds”. The elaboration pseudo-code
is given in Algorithm B.6 in the Appendix.
3.2.2 SP Set: Simple Templates To Derive Initial Fault Trees
In this section, we show another set of templates as an equivalent way to generate
the initial fault tree. In the DF template set, for data dependence errors, the templates
(DF-2 and DF-4) use the IDD information to go directly to the places in the CFG
where the variables-in-question are defined; these places could be many steps away
from the place where the variable is being used. In contrast to using IDD as in the DF
template set, the templates SP-2 and SP-4 in the SP set do not use IDD information,
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they instead go back through the CFG, one step at the time. We call this set of
templates the SP set6.
The control dependence information usage in this SP set is still the same as in the
DF-set.
There are two reasons for using the templates described in this section:
1. Using this set of templates, we do not have to compute the immediate data
dependence information ahead of time. It is an advantage when the system
failure of interest is associated with a vertex “close” to the beginning of the
process; in this case, the part of the CFG to be explored is much smaller than
the entire CFG.
2. We can leverage the previous implementation of FTA on Little-JIL process
models, developed by Bin Chen [3]. Chen uses templates that trace the data
flow on the CFG, one vertex back at a time.
We prove that this SP set of templates generates FTs that are equivalent to those
produced by the templates in the DF set described earlier in section 3.2.1. By that
we mean given the same top event, the FT derived using the SP template set has the
same cut sets as the FT derived using the DF template sets. The induction proof is
presented in Appendix A.
Table 3.2 shows the difference between the two sets of templates. The SP set also
uses some templates from the DF set, namely DF-1, DF-3, DF-5, DF-6 but it has its
own templates SP-2 and SP-4 to replace DF-2 and DF-4 respectively.
3.2.2.1 Template SP-2: “input to v is incorrect”
Template SP-2 (Figure 3.10) is self-explanatory. We just add one event “a is
incorrect when entering v” for each input a ∈ Use(v).
6SP stands for Simple.
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Template
in DF set
Event
Template
in SP set
Different templates
between two sets
DF-1 b output from v is incorrect DF-1 No
DF-2 input to v is incorrect SP-2 Yes
DF-3 b is incorrect when exiting v DF-3 No
DF-4 b is incorrect when entering v SP-4 Yes
DF-5 execution incorrectly reaches v DF-5 No
DF-6 predicate p(u,t) is incorrect DF-6 No
Table 3.2. Templates In DF Set And SP Set.
Figure 3.10. Template SP-2 For Event Type “input to v is incorrect”. The Kleene
star * indicates one event is added for each a ∈ Use(v).
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3.2.2.2 Template SP-4: “b is incorrect when entering v”
The value of b does not change when the control flows from vertex u ∈ Pred(v) to
v. If there is a predicate p(u, v) on the edge (u→ v), then we include that condition
on our FT template SP-4, as shown in Figure 3.11. Note that this is a simple template
in which we focus on one single error at a time. Therefore the event “predicate p(u, v)
holds” is considered a primary event and there is no further elaboration. Later in
the analysis, if users choose to elaborate on this part of the FT, such events will be
converted to intermediate events and thus will be further elaborated.
Figure 3.11. Template SP-4 For Event Type “b is incorrect when entering v”. The
Kleene star * indicates one event is added for each u ∈ Pred(v).
Error events
In a cut set, only events of the following types are considered error events :
• v is performed incorrectly producing incorrect a,
• a input to the system is incorrect.
Events of other types are not considered error events. For example, “v produces
incorrect b due to input a” is rather a consequence event, or “predicate p(u, t) holds”
is a boolean condition.
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3.3 “Issue ballot and get vote” Example
This section describes an example of analyzing a small model of an “Issue ballot
and get vote” (IB) system, from showing the derivation of the initial FT using the
SP template set to showing the need of incremental selective exploration of the cut
sets. This example system model is used in the following sections to keep illustrating
our approach.
Figure 3.12. CFG Annotated With Data Flow Information Of “Issue ballot and get
vote” System.
Figure 3.12 shows a CFG representation of “Issue ballot and get vote”, a very much
simplified portion of an election system that we already described in the background
section 2.4. When voters go to their polling place to vote, they are checked for
eligibility. In this model, the voter has to go through two checks. The first is to
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verify that the voter is registered by checking if the voter name is in the voting roll
(represented by vertex ‘verify registered’). So the inputs to this vertex are voterName
and votingRoll, and the output is a Boolean registered indicating whether the
voter is registered or not. Both voterName and votingRoll are inputs to (this part
of) the system, they are not defined within the system. If the voter passes the first
check, then the second check ‘verify not voted’ is done to verify that the voter has not
[already] voted. The inputs to this vertex are also voterName and votingRoll. The
outputs include: (1) a Boolean notVoted indicating whether the voter has not voted
(passes the check) or already voted (fails the check); and (2) votingRoll updated
with the information that the voter has voted.
If either of the checks fails, the control flows to ‘issue provisional’ — the voter is
given a provisional ballot, which is typically not examined unless the election is close.
If the voter passes both checks, the system control flows to ‘issue regular’ — the voter
is given a regular ballot.
The voter, after being issued an appropriate ballot, casts the vote (the control
flows to ‘cast vote’).
Let us consider a system failure “ ballot input into ‘cast vote’ is incorrect”. It
could be an eligible voter casting his/her vote using an provisional ballot, or an inel-
igible voter casting his/her vote using a regular ballot. The failure can be translated
to “ ballot is incorrect when entering ‘cast vote’ ” so we can apply our templates.
We apply the simple templates in the SP set described in section 3.2.2 to derive the
initial FT. Starting at the top event “ ballot is incorrect when entering ‘cast vote’ ”,
template SP-4 is applied to elaborate the event, resulting in two new intermediate
events “ ballot is incorrect when exiting ‘issue regular’ ” and “ ballot is incorrect
when exiting ‘issue provisional’ ”. Note that since there are no predicates on the edges
from ‘issue regular’ and ‘issue provisional’ to ‘cast vote’, each AND gate has only one
input event (Figure 3.13).
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Figure 3.13. Applying Simple Templates to “Issue ballot and get vote” System
Model Given the Failure “ ballot is incorrect when ‘cast vote’ starts”.
54
Template DF-3-case-3 is applied to elaborate the event “ ballot is incorrect when
exiting ‘issue regular’ ” since ballot is an output of ‘issue regular’, and ‘issue regular’
is not the start vertex. This results in the intermediate event “ ballot output from
‘issue regular’ is incorrect”, which is further elaborated using template DF-1. Since
‘issue regular’ does not have any input, there are only two cases: one is “ ‘issue regular’
is performed incorrectly and produces incorrect ballot”, and the other is “execution
incorrectly reaches ‘issue regular’ ”.
We keep applying the templates in the SP-set to elaborate intermediate events
until all the leaves of the resulting FT are primary events7. Figure 3.14 shows the
resulting initial FT. Note that the FT is in fact not exactly a tree structure as we
already mentioned in the Background section 2.1; there are several FT events each of
which is an input event to more than one gate.
Once the FT is derived, Boolean algebra is applied to compute its cut sets as
described in the Background section 2.1. There are 18 cut sets in this example, 3 of
which are found to be spurious using our technique discussed later in section 3.6. The
remained 15 cut sets are all minimal with one or two error events. Besides obvious
single-event cut sets such as
CS-1:
• ‘issue regular’ is performed incorrectly producing incorrect ballot
there are more complicated cut sets, e.g.,
7We could of course apply the templates in the DF set and would get an equivalent initial fault
tree. In order to do that we would have to compute in the IDD information before applying the DF
templates.
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Figure 3.14. Initial FT Derived From “Issue ballot and get vote” System Model
Given The Top Event “ballot is incorrect entering ‘cast vote’ ”.
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CS-2:
• ‘verify not-voted’ is performed incorrectly producing incorrect notVoted
• predicate ‘notVoted’ incorrectly holds due to input notVoted
One can understand from this cut set CS-2 that the Boolean notVoted has the
value true, but this value is incorrect because of the incorrect performance of the
‘verify not-voted’ step, implying that the voter is in fact already listed in the voting roll
as having voted. But it is not immediately understandable how the system execution
reaches the step ‘verify not-voted’ in the first place to produce the incorrect value of
notVoted and how this incorrect value of notVoted is related to the hazard. Our
new approach allows users to zoom in on a specific cut set by
• creating a projection of the initial FT that keeps only events relevant to this
cut set, resulting in what we call the focused FT ;
• applying detailed templates to this projected FT to derive a more detailed FT,
called elaborated FT ; and then
• automatically computing the new cut sets of the elaborated FT and generating
concrete scenarios showing ways that the events in the cut sets can occur and
how they can then lead to the failure.
The next section discusses the projection of a FT given a cut set to derive the
focused FT.
3.4 Deriving The Focused Fault Tree
Given a FT and one of its cut sets, the focused FT is a subtree of the original FT,
and the set of all the leaves of the subtree is exactly the given cut set.
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For example, given the FT in Figure 2.1 and a cut set {E,F}, the focused FT is
the subtree as shown in Figure 3.15(B) — Figure 3.15(A) shows the original FT with
the irrelevant parts grayed out, so the reader has can see easily that the focused FT
is a subtree of the original; Figure 3.15(B) shows that subtree alone, only laid out
differently due to the graph layout algorithm of the yEd tool we use8.
Figure 3.15. Focused Fault Tree Example.
To derive the focused FT, we first mark all the primary events that are contained
in the given cut set as relevant. We traverse the tree from the root, recursively visit
each event’s input gate and each gate’s input events. After all of the input events of
a gate are visited, if (1) the gate is an OR gate and one of its events is relevant, or (2)
the gate is an AND gate and all of its input events are relevant, then mark the gate
as relevant. After an event’s input gate is visited, if the gate is marked as relevant,
then mark the event as relevant. Once all the marking is done, we can get rid of all
the gates and events that not marked as relevant. The remainder is the focused FT
with respect to the given cut set. By construction, the events and gates that are not
marked relevant are not relevant to showing how the primary events in the cut sets
are combined (via the Boolean gates) to lead to the top event.
8http://www.yWorks.com
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Figure 3.16 shows the focused FT given the cut set CS-2. This focused FT is the
projection of the initial FT derived from “Issue ballot and get vote” model given the
failure “ballot is incorrect when ‘cast vote’ starts”, focusing on the cut set CS-2.
Figure 3.16. Focused Fault Tree Given Cut Set CS-2.
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With the cut set CS-2, the focused FT reveals that because notVoted is incorrectly
true, the system execution incorrectly reaches ‘issue regular’, therefore the output
ballot from that vertex is considered incorrect. But the user might then want to
understand better how the execution can ever reach ‘verify not-voted’ in the first
place. We facilitate the understanding by applying our new detailed templates to
derive the focused-elaborated FT. The next section discusses the elaboration of the
focused FT using detailed templates.
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3.5 Zooming In On An Initial Cut Set With Detailed Tem-
plates
In this second phase of the analysis, we elaborate the focused FT to an elabo-
rated FT (see the flow chart in Figure 3.1.) The key idea for this elaboration is
threefold: (1) considering how the execution reaches the original source of error, (2)
elaborating events that are considered primary in the initial FT, and (3) considering
the combinations of errors.
First, in deriving the initial FT, the SP templates allow users to trace back through
the control flow graph to where a data variable b first gets an incorrect value, let’s say
vertex v; it could be because an input a into v is incorrect, so the elaboration proceeds
further back to where a first gets the incorrect value; it could be because the value
of b input to the system is incorrect (if v is the start vertex); it could be because
the execution incorrectly reaches v so output b from v is considered incorrect; or it
could be because v is performed incorrectly, therefore producing an incorrect value of
b. For the latter case, no more further elaboration is done in deriving the initial FT.
In elaborating the focused FT, when we encounter the situation where v is performed
incorrectly producing incorrect b, we are interested in how the execution reaches v as
well.
Second, the event “predicate p(u, t) holds” which is considered a primary event
in the initial FT, is now considered an intermediate event in the elaborated FT. It is
elaborated by applying a new template.
Third, in deriving the initial FT, the SP templates consider only single errors as
input events to an OR gate, causing its output event. In elaborating the focused FT,
we consider combinations of errors, that is, sometimes two or more error events occur
together causing the output event.
To achieve the above three goals, we develop a new set of templates called DT —
detailed template set. Below, we describe how this DT template set is different from
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the SP set: what SP templates can be used in the DT set, what SP templates have to
be replaced by their DT counterparts, and what detailed templates are newly added
to the DT set.
Table 3.3 shows the difference between the two sets of templates SP (simple) and
DT (detailed). The DT set also uses some templates from the SP set, namely DF-3
and SP-4 but it has its own templates DT-1, DT-2 and DT-6 to replace DF-1, SP-2
and DF-6 respectively. In addition, the DT set also has two new templates: DT-7 to
elaborate events of type “predicate p(u,t) holds” and DT-8 to elaborate “execution
correctly reaches v”. Both of those events are not applicable in deriving the initial FT
using the simple templates but they appear in elaborating the focused FT as shown
later in this section.
Template
in SP set
Event
Template
in DT set
Different templates
between two sets
DF-1 b output from v is incorrect DT-1 Yes
SP-2 input to v is incorrect DT-2 Yes
DF-3 b is incorrect when exiting v DF-3 No9
SP-4 b is incorrect when entering v SP-4 No10
DF-5 execution incorrectly reaches v DF-5 No11
DF-6 predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds DT-6 Yes
N/A predicate p(u, t) holds DT-7 Yes
N/A execution correctly reach v DT-8 Yes
Table 3.3. Templates In DT Set And SP Set.
9There is no error combination in DF-3.
10SP-4 (Figure 3.11) elaborates the event of type “b is incorrect when entering v” by listing all
possible events of type “b is incorrect when exiting u” where u ∈ Pred(v). In one failure-enabling
scenario, the data item b can only flow to v from one predecessor u, it cannot be the case that “b is
incorrect when exiting u1” and “b is incorrect when exiting u2” at the same time, u1, u2 ∈ Pred(v),
to make “b is incorrect when entering v”. There cannot be a combination of errors here.
11DF-5 (Figure 3.7) elaborates the event of type “execution incorrectly reaches v”. The two single
errors being considered in this templates are (1) conjunction of (1a) the execution incorrectly reaches
u and (1b) predicate p(u, t) holds, and (2) the control-dependent edge predicate p(u, t) incorrectly
holds. To consider error combinations, we obviously would want to add another input event as a
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3.5.1 Template DT-1: “b output from v is incorrect”
As mentioned in the simple template section 3.2.1, the value of b coming out of v
is considered incorrect only if any of the followings happens:
1. Any input into v is incorrect (data dependence error);
2. The execution incorrectly reaches v (control dependence error); or
3. v is performed incorrectly (agent error).
In this phase of analysis, we consider not only single errors but also combinations
of errors, therefore any combination of the three above should be listed as a possible
cause of the event “b output from v is incorrect”. Figure 3.17 shows the elaboration
of “b output from v is incorrect”, listing all possible combinations of errors. Note
that there is a special case where “agent error” is a conjunction of “v is performed
incorrectly producing incorrect b” and “execution correctly reaches v”. The latter
event is added, so that the final results (cut sets of the elaborated FT) provide
necessary information to construct concrete scenarios — execution paths in the system
model — showing how the failure could arise.
All the intermediate events in the template with generic names, such as “data de-
pendence error”, etc. are specific to the elaboration of “b output from v is incorrect”.
We index those events to separate them from those coming from the elaboration of
any other events of the same type “b′ output from v′ is incorrect”.
conjunction of (1a) and (2). However, template DT-7 elaborates the event (1b) “predicate p(u, t)
holds” as shown in Figure 3.20, resulting in the conjunction of (1a) and (2) to be an input event of
“execution incorrectly reaches v”. So there is no need to replace template DF-5.
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Figure 3.17. Template DT-1 For Event Type “b output from v is incorrect”.
3.5.2 Template DT-2: “input to v is incorrect”
To elaborate this event, we have to iterate through all the possible combinations
of input variables into v, which are all possible subsets of Use(v), in other words, all
the elements in P(Use(v)) — the power set of Use(v) (see Figure 3.18).
Figure 3.18. Template DT-2 For Event Type “input into v is incorrect”. The symbol
* indicates that one event is added for each S, a subset of Use(v), or S ∈ P(Use(v)).
The symbol ** indicates that one event is added for each artifact a ∈ S.
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3.5.3 Template DT-6: “predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds”
Similar to DT-2 in section 3.5.2, to elaborate this event, we also have to iterate
through all the possible combinations of variables input to u to compute predicate
p(u, t), which are all possible subsets of Use(p(u, t)), in other words, all the elements
in P(Use(p(u, t))) — the power set of Use(p(u, t)) (see Figure 3.19).
Figure 3.19. Template DT-6 For Event Type “predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds”.
The symbol * indicates that one event is added for each S, a subset of Use(p(u, t)),
or S ∈ P(Use(p(u, t))). The symbol ** indicates that one event is added for each
artifact a ∈ S.
3.5.4 Template DT-7: “predicate p(u, t) holds”
This template (Figure 3.20) is self-explanatory. The event “predicate p(u, t) holds”
is a disjunction of the intermediate event “predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds” and the
primary event “predicate p(u, t) correctly holds”.
Figure 3.20. Template DT-7 For Event Type “predicate p(u, t) holds”.
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3.5.5 Template DT-8: “execution correctly reaches v”
This template (Figure 3.21) does not explore or trace back causes of any error. It
basically serves the purpose of constructing the execution path in the process model,
which helps generate concrete scenarios of a cut set. In this template, we iterate
through all control dependent edges (u→ t) of v, i.e. (u→ t) ∈ CD(v). To have the
execution correctly reach v, we must have the execution correctly reaches u and the
predicate on the edge (u→ t) has to correctly hold.
Figure 3.21. Template DT-8 For Event Type “execution correctly reaches v”. The
symbol * indicates that one event is added for each (u→ t) ∈ CD(v).
3.5.6 Elaborating The Focused Fault Tree
Unlike deriving the initial FT using the simple templates in which we start with
one top event (representing the system failure), in this phase of analysis, to derive
the elaborated FT, we start with the focused FT, not just a single event. Note that
in the initial FT, all the primary events are of one of the following types:
• a input to the system is incorrect (from template DF-3-case-1);
• predicate p(u, t) holds (from templates SP-4 and DF-5);
• v is performed incorrectly producing incorrect b (from template DF-1).
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The focused FT is the projection of the initial FT, keeping only events relevant
to the chosen initial cut set. Its primary events are thus also of the types mentioned
above.
In order to elaborate this focused FT, first, we have to make some of the primary
events become intermediate events so that we can elaborate them. Since the first
event type “a input to the system is incorrect” deals with the data item being incorrect
from outside of the scope of the system, no further elaboration is possible. The second
event type “predicate p(u, t) holds” can be further elaborated into a disjunction of the
primary event “predicate p(u, t) correctly holds” and the intermediate event “predicate
p(u, t) incorrectly holds” using template DT-7 as shown in Figure 3.20.
The last primary event “v is performed incorrectly producing incorrect b” only
appears in template DF-1 (Figure 3.3), which means it only “stems” from the event
“b output from v is incorrect”. To elaborate the event “v is performed incorrectly
producing incorrect b”, we must consider it as a single error as well as consider it as
a part of an error combinations as listed in template DT-1 (section 3.5.1). Therefore,
we convert the stem in the focused FT into a partial FT as shown in Figure 3.22. In
the figure, the top part is template DF-1. We are interested in only the stem with
the input event “v is performed incorrectly producing incorrect b”. The other two are
kept in the figure, but grayed out, so that readers easily see that the stem comes from
template DF-1. The bottom part of the figure is in fact template DT-1 and we keep
only the parts related to the agent error; the gray parts have nothing to do with the
agent error.
Note that given the system model and the failure, the detailed templates could
be applied from the beginning without having to applying the simple templates in
the first phase and then the detailed templates in the second. The result would
be one fault tree whose set of cut sets is the union of all elaborated cut sets of all
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Figure 3.22. Converting A Stem In The Focused Fault Tree.
of the elaborated FTs when applying the two-phase approach. Using the two-phase
approach, however, allows users to selectively explore the possible causes of the failure.
3.6 Removing Inconsistent And Spurious Cut Sets
Our FT construction is based on templates, which more or less explore the local
errors around the FT events being elaborated. Once the elaborated FT is constructed,
the results incorporate information at a global scale, and the local exploration of
templates might result in some inconsistent and spurious outcomes.
A cut set is said to be inconsistent if it is impossible for all of its events to happen
in one system execution. For example, assuming the value of P does not change
during a system execution, P and ¬P cannot happen in the same execution, making
any cut set containing both P and ¬P inconsistent. We can automatically identify
such cut sets and remove them from the result.
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A cut set is said to be spurious if all system executions, each of which contains
the events in this cut set and not all the events in any other cut set, turn out to not
result in the top event. We develop an algorithm to identify and eliminate certain
types of spurious cut sets. Below is a motivating example.
One cut set of the initial FT example shown in the previous section (Figure 3.14)
is:
Cut set S:
• voterName input to the system is incorrect
• predicate ‘registered’ incorrectly holds due to input registereda
• predicate ‘¬ notVoted’ holds
aThe variable registered is an input to the predicate ‘registered’.
Figure 3.23 shows, on the left hand side, the focused FT of cut set S. The focused
FT shows that, since voterName input to the system is incorrect, it makes the value
of registered incorrectly true, thus the predicate ‘registered’ incorrectly holds.
That means, the correct value of registered has to be false. Because the predicate
‘registered’ incorrectly holds, the execution goes to ‘verify not-voted’. In this sce-
nario, notVoted has the value false, leading the execution to ‘issue provisional’ and
then ‘cast vote’12. This execution path is marked as red on the CFG on the right
hand side of Figure 3.23.
So, if the error (“ voterName input to the system is incorrect”), which leads to
registered having the incorrect value true, was caught, then registered would
have had the correct value false and the execution would go from ‘verify registered’
12Of course there are other scenarios in which notVoted has the value true, either correctly or
incorrectly, but we are considering the scenario in which notVoted has the value false.
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to ‘issue provisional’ and then “cast vote”. This execution path is marked as dashed
green on the CFG on the right hand side of Figure 3.23.
Both execution paths (one according to the cut set, and one with the error being
caught) end up at the same vertex ‘issue provisional’. Consider the case that person
A is not registered in his/her correct name; A then impersonates a registered voter
B, goes to the polling place, gives B’s name (thus voterName input to the system is
incorrect), is verified as registered, and then fails the ‘verify not-voted’ check because
B has already voted in this election, so A ends up getting a provisional ballot. So
this ineligible voter A does not get a regular ballot, but a ballot he or she should have
gotten if everything had been done correctly. This cut set is considered spurious.
We would like to identify cut sets of this sort and eliminate them. We have
developed an algorithm, shown as Algorithm 3.2, that can correctly identify some
spurious cut sets. It is based on the fact that, on the execution path, if at the first
branching vertex v that has two successors w1 and w2 and there is an event in the
cut set that says “predicate p(v, w1) incorrectly holds”, then we know that (v → w1)
is the incorrect branch, thus (v → w2) is the correct branch. Let P be the path in
the CFG from w2 to either the next branching vertex or the vertex right before end,
formally as follows:
P = 〈w2, w3, ..., wn〉
with n ≥ 2, ∀i such that 1 ≤ i < n, (wi → wi+1) ∈ E, wn 6= end, and either
(wn → end) ∈ E or ∃x, y ∈ V, x 6= y : (wn → x) ∈ E ∧ (wn → y) ∈ E.
Let VP be the set of all vertices in P , then if the incorrect execution from v to w1
somehow ends up at any w ∈ VP without encountering a failure-influencing label13, it
13i.e., encountering a vertex u whose output is a and that au is a failure-influencing label
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Figure 3.23. Spurious Result Example.
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Function isSpurious()
input : CFG, cutset– the cut set of interest
output: spurious– true if cutset is spurious, false otherwise
// Initialization
correctPlaces ←− ∅ ;
reachCorrectNotModData ←− false;
noErrSinceCorrect ←− true;
current ←− start;
while current 6= end do
// advance to the next vertex in the CFG
if current has only one successor then
current ←− the only successor;
else
use events with predicates in cutset to determine the next vertex, called next;
if reachCorrectNotModData ∧ (cutset contains error events at current )
then
noErrSinceCorrect ←− false;
if (correctPlaces = ∅) ∧ (cutset contains event “predicate on
(current→ next) incorrectly holds”) ∧ (current has only two successors)
then
correctPlaces ←− getCorrectPlaces(the other successor that is not
next) ;
modifiedDataFromBranch ←− false;
current ←− next;
if (correctPlaces 6= ∅) ∧ (current has output) then
modifiedDataFromBranch ←− true;
if (current ∈ correctPlaces ) ∧ (modifiedDataFromBranch = false) then
reachCorrectNotModData ←− true;
spurious ←− reachCorrectNotModData ∧ noErrSinceCorrect;
return spurious;
Function getCorrectPlaces(v)
input : v
output: correctPlaces
correctPlaces ←− ∅ ;
while v 6= end do
correctPlaces ←− correctPlaces +{v } ;
if v has only one successor then
v ←− the successor ;
else
return correctPlaces;
return correctPlaces;
Algorithm 3.2: Determine Spurious.
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is safe to say that even taking the incorrect branch, the outcome is the same14. So if
the outcome at w is the same, whether taking the incorrect branch (v → w1) or the
correct branch (v → w2) to w, and from w to the end of the execution, no more error
is made to lead to the top event, then the cut set is decided to be spurious.
In the algorithm, we call VP the correctPlaces. We use noErrSinceCorrect
to keep track whether the execution from correctPlaces to the end encounters any
more error events. Once the correctPlaces has been found, we also use
modifiedDataFromBranch to keep track whether the execution from the branching
point v has encountered any failure-influencing label. We use reachCorrectNotModData
to keep track whether or not the execution has reaches the correctPlaces without
encountering any failure-influencing label along the way.
This algorithm is sound, but not complete. We cannot guarantee that when the
algorithm returns false, the input cut set is not spurious.
14When the execution takes the incorrect branch from v to w1, even if the execution ends up at
w ∈ VP but the execution has changed some data which affects the value of the variable at the
failure vertex, we cannot guarantee that the outcome is the same as when the execution takes the
correct branch from v to w2.
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3.7 Generating Scenarios
Given a cut set, we can generate a scenario showing how the failure may arise.
We call the vertex mentioned in the top event the failure vertex vf . A scenario is an
execution path in the CFG, from start to vf , that contains all events in the cut set.
By the way our FTs are constructed, the primary events can only be of the fol-
lowing types:
• E1: b input to the system is incorrect,
• E2: v is performed incorrectly and produces incorrect b,
• E3: predicate p(u, t) holds.
We want to find a path in the CFG from start to vf that includes all vertices
mentioned in the E2 events, called E2 vertices, and satisfies all the predicates men-
tioned in E3 events, called E3 predicates, of the cut set. E1 events are simply put at
the start vertex.
It’s noted that each E3 event uniquely identifies an edge (u→ t). When searching
for scenarios, we want to make sure that, at the decision-making vertex u, the control
flow has to take the edge (u→ t) and not any other outgoing edges emanating from
u. Therefore, we may ignore all of these other outgoing edges emanating from u from
the CFG.
The remaining problem is simply finding a path between start and vf that con-
tains the E2 vertices in the cut set. We employ a best-first-search algorithm to solve
this problem.
For this search problem, each search state is a structure that contains the following
information: the CFG vertex v that this node corresponds to, and the goal status g
that contains the remaining E3 vertices that we still need to cover in order to satisfy
the goal.
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Let S be the set of all E2 vertices of the given cut set. The initial state has no
parent so the CFG vertex it corresponds to is the start, and the goal status g is S.
The goal state must have the failure vertex vf as the corresponding CFG vertex, and
the goal status g must be ∅.
We use a worklist to store search states to be examined and a visited list to
store all states that have been evaluated and will not be looked at again. We also
use parent to map a search state to its parent state in order to reconstruct the CFG
path after reaching the goal state. The initial state has no parent.
Algorithm 3.3 shows the algorithm that returns a scenario given the cut set.
Note that this algorithm is a best-first-search algorithm. In order to get all possible
scenarios, one can apply a typical breath-first-search algorithm on the CFG to get
all the paths from start to vf and select all the paths that contain the all of the E2
vertices of the given cut set.
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input : cut set, CFG, vf
output: scenario
// pre-process the CFG
foreach E3 event “predicate p(u, t) holds” in the cut set do
Delete all edges {(u→ t′) | t′ 6= t} from the CFG;
// the initial state
current.v ←− start;
current.g ←− S; // all the E2 vertices in the cut set
parent [current] ←− null;
visited ←− ∅;
worklist ←− {current} ;
while worklist is not empty do
current ←− the search state from worklist with fewest vertices in its goal status g;
Remove current from worklist;
Add current to visited;
if current.v = vf ∧ current.g = ∅ then // reach the goal
// trace back from current using recorded parent
// initialize scenario, which is a sequence of vertices
scenario ←− 〈current.v〉 ;
while current.v 6= start do
current ←− parent [current ] ;
// add the current vertex to head of the scenario sequence
scenario ←− 〈current.v〉+ scenario;
Return scenario;
Compute successors of current;
// successor of current is s such that
// (current.v, s.v) is an edge in CFG
// and s.g = current.g − s.v
foreach successor s of current do
if s is not in worklist then
Add s to worklist;
parent [s] ←− current;
Algorithm 3.3: Generate Scenario.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION
In this work, we designed and implemented a two-phase Fault Tree Analysis ap-
proach that automatically identified causes of potential failures in complex systems
and allows users to incrementally explore those causes. To evaluate this approach,
we applied it to several non-trivial real-world human-intensive processes: Issue Ballot
and Get Vote (IB), Count Votes (CV), Chemotherapy (CM), In-patient Blood Trans-
fusion (BT). These systems have been subjects of other projects to model and analyze
human-intensive processes [7, 8, 28]. As mentioned earlier, although they are called
processes, they are indeed systems with control and data flow information, suitable
subjects for our approach.
Both IB and CV processes are sub-processes of the larger election process in Yolo
County, California. The CM and BT processes are also real-world processes that were
employed by Baystate Medical Center, a hospital in Springfield, Massachusetts, at
the time the above-mentioned projects were conducted. As those projects’ outcomes,
the process models were available to be used in this work. In those projects, analysts
had shadowed performers of the real processes, and interviewed the performers and
domain experts who could also be the process performers to elicit the process models.
The analysts, with the help from the domain experts, had then reviewed, evaluated,
and corrected the process models to make sure the models accurately and concisely
represent the the processes. The processes were modeled in Little-JIL, a modeling
language with expressive and well-defined semantics so that the resulting models can
be analyzed rigorously.
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We chose these processes because, first, their process models were readily available
for analysis so we did not have to elicit the process models. Second, these processes
are important real-life processes. Third, these processes incorporate non-trivial data
and control flows, therefore they are good vehicles for demonstrating and evaluating
our approach.
By applying the two-phase FTA approach to the four processes with corresponding
failure specifications, we have found that:
1. Using the detailed templates led to scenarios that completely specified the paths
through the process that could result in the failures. This finding confirms the
usability of the approach which is to help users better understand possible causes
of process failures.
2. Some spurious cut sets could be automatically identified and therefore elimi-
nated. However, among the four processes, we only discovered spurious cut sets
in the IB process. Our algorithm did not find spurious cut sets in the other
processes.
3. The FTA result size, in terms of the numbers of initial cut sets, of elaborated
cut sets and and of minimal cut sets (MCSs), depended on multiple factors,
which include the overall number of failure-influencing variables, the number of
such variables input to a step, the number of steps that have multiple failure-
influencing inputs, and the complexity of the control flow to the step that cor-
responds to the top event.
4. Using all available control and data dependence information resulted in a larger
number of MCSs for the domain experts to examine. We discovered MCSs that
were not found using Chen’s approach. The larger number of MCSs, however,
could be overwhelming to the users. We suggest in this chapter some techniques
that could be used to make the FTA result more manageable.
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In the remainder of this chapter, we first describe how a Little-JIL process model
is translated to a CFG suitable to be used in our FTA approach. We then give a
brief introduction to the four selected processes. After that, we present our findings
in more details. Finally, we discuss the impact on FT derivation of some limitations
of Little-JIL.
4.1 Applying The Approach To Little-JIL Process Models
Our FTA approach works on system models represented as CFGs with data flow
information. To apply our approach to a Little-JIL process model, first we have to
translate the Little-JIL model to a CFG.
4.1.1 Translating A Little-JIL Model To A Control Flow Graph
As mentioned in the Background Chapter (section 2.4), Little-JIL represents a
process as a hierarchy of steps. A step is the basic building block of a Little-JIL
model. A step represents a unit of work in the process and may be decomposed into
sub-steps. Every Little-JIL model has a root step that represents the entire process.
This step is decomposed as far as necessary to describe the process. The execution of
a Little-JIL step is modeled as progress through several states. Step execution begins
in the POSTED state during which the execution of the step is assigned to an agent.
The execution then proceeds to the STARTED state, when the agent begins performing
the step. Eventually the step enters either the COMPLETED state (normal execution)
or the TERMINATED state (the execution ends with an exception).
In the CFG representation G = (V,E, start, end) of a Little-JIL model, each
CFG vertex is a state of a step in the Little-JIL model. There is an edge from u to v
if and only if the step state u may immediately precede v according to the Little-JIL
process definition. We can determine whether step state u may immediately precede
step state v based on the Little-JIL semantics. The CFG start vertex is the POSTED
79
state of the root step, because it is the first state of any process execution. Since the
execution can end at the COMPLETED or TERMINATED state of the root step, we add an
extra end vertex, and an edge from each COMPLETED or TERMINATED state of the root
step to this end vertex. Figure 4.1 shows the CFG corresponding to the Little-JIL
model of the IB (“Issue ballot and get vote”) process described in section 2.4.
We note that in the CFG for a Little-JIL model, each vertex represents a state of
a step rather than an execution unit. Those step states (vertices) cannot produce or
update values for any artifact (data item). In a Little-JIL model, only leaf steps can
produce or update values of its output artifacts. So to make it easier to understand
the adaptation of our FTA approach to Little-JIL process models, for each leaf step
s, we introduce an intermediate vertex “perform s” to represent the actual execution
of the step s, and only these vertices have Def and Use information1. The addition
of the new vertex is as follows:
• add one new vertex called “perform s”;
• add outgoing edges for “perform s” to the existing immediate successors of “s
STARTED”;
• remove all outgoing edges of “s STARTED”; and
• add one edge from “s STARTED” to “perform s”;
• add input artifacts of s to the Use of “perform s”;
• add output artifacts of s to the Def of “perform s”.
. Figure 4.2 shows an example for such addition for a leaf step s which has one
exception e.
1We show later in Section 4.1.2.3 that in the actual implementation, we do not need to add this
type of vertex.
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Figure 4.1. CFG Of The Little-JIL Process Model Of “Issue ballot and get vote”.
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Figure 4.2. Adding “perform s” Vertex In The CFG For Each Leaf Step s.
In the CFG of the IB process (Figure 4.1), there are six vertices of type “perform
s” (e.g., “perform verify registered”, “perform verify not-voted”) corresponding to six
leaf steps in the Litte-JIL model of the process; they are annotated with Def and Use
information.
As we require the CFG to be acyclic, we first have to “unroll” and “bound”
the Little-JIL model. The recursive steps and steps with unbounded cardinality are
unrolled to step instances up to bounds given by the analyst. Note that unbounded
cardinality is a Little-JIL language feature that allows the agent of the step to decide
how many times the step should be repeated. Unbounded cardinality does not mean
the step is repeated infinitively. For example, in the “Count Votes” process as shown
later in this chapter (Figure 4.11), the step “count votes for precinct” has unbounded
cardinality (depicted by the + symbol) used to indicate the step is executed once
for each precinct. An example of infinite recursive execution is: step S throws an
exception e, which is handled by step H, and the exception handling specification
specifies that S is restarted after e is handled by H. Thus the loop S → H → S →
H → ... could be infinite. There is no infinite recursion in the four process models in
our evaluation.
The details of process unrolling are given in section 3.2.2 of Chen’s PhD thesis [3].
The process analyst is asked to designate upper bounds for recursive steps as well
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as steps with unbounded cardinalities. Given these bounds, a process unrolling pre-
processor unrolls the input Little-JIL process model into a unrolled version of the
process that contains a finite number of step instances. In addition, a step may be
used multiple times in a Little-JIL process via step references. The process unrolling
turns each step reference into a step instance. As a result, the unrolled process model
becomes a tree of step instances. From this point forward, we use “process” to re-
fer to the unrolled Little-JIL process model, and we use “step” and “step instance”
interchangeably to refer to a step instance in the unrolled Little-JIL process model.
In the Little-JIL model of the IB process, ‘issue provisional’ is defined to handle the
exception VoterNotRegistered thrown by ‘verify registered’; and a reference to ‘issue
provisional’ is defined to handle the exception AlreadyVoted thrown by ‘verify not-
voted’. Once the unrolling of the Little-JIL process model is done, ‘issue provisional’
and ‘issue provisional’ reference are two separate independent step instances. We use
indices to distinguish them — ‘issue provisional 1’ and ‘issue provisional 2’ as shown
in the CFG (Figure 4.1). Note that the Algorithm 3.2 to determine the spuriousness
of a cut set has to consider ‘issue provisional 1’ and issue provisional 2’ as the same
step.
If a leaf step s is specified with an exception, named e, it means that from
the STARTED state of the step, the execution can either go to COMPLETED state or
TERMINATED state of the step, depending on whether e is thrown or not. With the
addition of the vertex “perform s” for the leaf step s, we have edges from this vertex
to its immediate successors guarded with predicates as follows:
• from “perform s” to “s COMPLETED”: the edge predicate is “s does not throw
exception e”,
• from “perform s” to “s TERMINATED”: the edge predicate is “s throws exception
e”.
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In case the leaf step s is specified to have more than one exception e1, e2, ..., en, we
can duplicate the “s TERMINATED” state and add predicates on the edges as follows:
• the guarded edge from “perform s” to “s COMPLETED” has the edge predicate
“s does not throw any exception”, which is equivalent to
∧
i
(s does not throw ei),
• a guarded edge from “perform s” to “s TERMINATED i” with the edge predicate
“s throws exception ei”.
Little-JIL allows a step to throw more than one exception in one execution, but
here we assume that a step can throw at most one exception in one execution. To
handle multiple exception throwing in a single execution, more vertices and edges
should be added to the CFG; we leave this for future work.
In the IB process example, Figure 4.1 shows four predicates on four edges, two
outgoing from “perform verify registered”, and two from “perform verify not-voted”.
We treat these predicates specially when customizing the FTA templates for Little-
JIL as described later in section 4.1.2.
4.1.2 Applying Simple Templates To Little-JIL Models
Most vertices in the Little-JIL CFG have the form “s−{STATE}” in which {STATE}
is one of the possible step states. At those vertices, an artifact’s value does not change
between entering and exiting the vertices. Therefore, an event of type “a is incorrect
when exiting s−{STATE}” will be elaborated using the Template DF-3-case-3 as shown
in Figure 4.3 (A). To make the fault tree smaller and easier to understand without
changing the final result (cut sets), we can substitute the the sub-tree (Figure 4.3
(A)) by a single event “a is incorrect when s is {STATE}”.
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So from this point forward, when we elaborate an event of type “a is incorrect
when s is {STATE}”, it means we elaborate the event “a is incorrect when entering
s-{STATE}”.
Figure 4.3. Simplifying DF-3-case-3 When Applying to Little-JIL.
In our generic approach, a system failure is specified to be an incorrect variable
input to or output from a specific execution unit of the system (each execution unit
is a vertex in the system’s CFG). With Little-JIL models, we also specify a failure
to be an artifact input to or output from a specific step. But since a step does not
correspond to a vertex in the Little-JIL model’s CFG, we have to translate the failure
specification differently.
For example, the failure is “b input to step s is incorrect” is translated to “b is
incorrect when s is STARTED”; the failure is “b output from step s is incorrect” is
translated to “b is incorrect when s is COMPLETED”.
To derive the initial FT, simple templates in the SP set are applied. And to derive
the elaborated FT, detailed templates in the DT set are applied as described in the
Approach Chapter. Most of the applications are straight forward, however, we make
some adjustments or create new templates to better suit Litte-JIL. In the remainder
of this section, we describe the adjustments and the new Little-JIL FTA templates. It
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is important to note that all these variations could be expressed in terms of different
ways of translating from Little-JIL to the CFG.
4.1.2.1 Elaborating “b is incorrect when s-POSTED” When s Is Not The
Root Step
We want to present this template because it shows the use of Little-JIL’s param-
eter bindings. As described in the Background Chapter, each Little-JIL step has an
artifact declaration that specifies the artifacts it is accessing or providing. Artifacts
are generally passed through the coordination hierarchy between steps and their sub-
steps using parameter binding. In the “Issue ballot and get vote” example, the ballot
artifact is an output parameter of the step ‘issue regular’; it is bound to the ballot
parameter of the parent step ‘issue ballot’; so is the ballot output parameter of the
step ‘issue provisional’. Parameters of different steps might have the same name,
(‘issue ballot’, ‘issue regular’, ‘issue provisional’ and ‘cast vote’ all have a parameter
called ballot), therefore we use ‘parameter name @ step name’ to distinguish them.
We use a graph, called Parameter Binding Graph (PBG), to capture the bindings
among different parameters. It is a directed graph Gp = (Vp, Ep) where Vp is the set
of parameters in the process, and Ep is the set of edges. There is an edge from p1 to
p2 if and ony if there is a parameter binding indicating that p1’s value is passed to
p2. So in Gp, a definition-free path from p1 to p2 is a path in Gp from p1 to p2, along
which none of the parameters except p1 and p2 is an output parameter of a leaf step.
Recall that only leaf steps in Little-JIL are allowed to change the value of its output
parameter. Thus, a definition-free path from p1 to p2 indicates that the value of p1 is
passed to p2.
Figure 4.4 gives the PBG for the “Issue ballot and get vote” process.
Go back to elaborating “b is incorrect when s-POSTED” when s is not the root
step. Given that s is not the root step (which would make s-POSTED the start vertex
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Figure 4.4. Parameter Binding Graph (PBG) Of “Issue ballot and get vote”.
of the CFG), applying the simple template SP-4, we basically have the elaboration as
shown in Figure 4.5. In this elaboration, if there exists a parameter of s′, named a,
and there is a from a to b in the PBG, then b′ ≡ a, otherwise b′ ≡ b. In case there is
no such a, the template is exactly the same as SP-4. In case there is such a parameter
a, i.e., a’s value is passed to b, saying “b is incorrect when s′−{STATE}” is equivalent
to saying “a is incorrect when s′−{STATE}”.
Figure 4.5. Applying SP-4 To Elaborate “b is incorrect when s is POSTED”.
87
Figure 4.6. Example Of Applying SP-4 To “b is incorrect when s is POSTED”.
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In Figure 4.6 (A) showing the example of applying SP-4 to “ ‘votingRoll @ verify
not-voted’ is incorrect when ‘verify not-voted is POSTED’ ”, we see that ‘verify not-
voted - POSTED’ is immediately preceded by ‘verify registered - COMPLETED’. Since
there is no parameter of ‘verify register’ being passed into ‘votingRoll @ verify not-
voted’, the elaboration results in the new intermediate event “ ‘votingRoll @ verify
not-voted’ is incorrect when ‘verify registered is COMPLETED’ ”.
Further elaboration arrives at the event “ ‘votingRoll @ verify not-voted’ is incor-
rect when ‘verify registered is POSTED’ ”. Also applying template SP-4 (Figure 4.6
(B)), this time we see that ‘verify registered - POSTED’ is immediately preceded by
‘issue ballot - STARTED’. Since the parameter ‘votingRoll @ issue ballot’ is bound to
‘votingRoll @ verify not-voted’ (see the PBG in Figure 4.4), the elaboration results in
the new intermediate event “ ‘votingRoll @ issue ballot’ is incorrect when ‘issue ballot
is COMPLETED’ ”.
4.1.2.2 Elaborating “b is incorrect when s-POSTED” When s Is The Root
Step
When s is the root step, “s-POSTED” is the start vertex of the CFG.
Obviously if b is an input parameter of s, then the event “b is incorrect when
s-POSTED” must be caused by “b input to the process is incorrect”, similar to DF-
3-case-1. We decide to not elaborate the event in this case. It is easily understood
that “b is incorrect when the root step is posted” means “b input to the process is
incorrect”.
If b is not an input parameter of s, the event “b is incorrect when s-POSTED” is
marked as impossible. The impossible events are pruned from the fault tree after the
whole fault tree is derived.
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4.1.2.3 Elaborating “b is incorrect when s is COMPLETED”
In Little-JIL, only leaf steps can manipulate their own parameters, non-leaf steps
can only pass parameters. Thus the elaboration of “b is incorrect when s is COMPLETED”
depends on whether s is a leaf step, and whether b is the output artifact of s.
In the case s is a leaf step and b is the output artifact of s, we can see that b’s
value can be propagated from only “perform s”, on the condition that s must not
throw any exception2. Template SP-4 is used to elaborate “b is incorrect when s is
COMPLETED” as shown in Figure 4.7 (A). In Figure 4.7, we use circled numbers to
mark the fault tree events. For the purpose of brevity, we use those numbers to refer
to the events.
Applying Template SP-4 to event 1 yields two intermediate events — 3 “b is
incorrect when exiting ‘perform s’ ” and 4 “s does not throw any exception”. We
discuss how to elaborate the latter event later in the next section. Elaborating the
former event is straightforward, using Template DF-1. Templates SP-2, SP-4, and
DF-3-case-3 are then applied to yield the fault tree as we have in Figure 4.7 (A).
We can compact the fault tree in Figure 4.7 (A) into the fault tree in Figure 4.7
(B) to make the tree smaller without compromising the result. First of all, since b
is the output of s, the value of b can be propagated to “s-COMPLETED” only from
“perform s”, therefore there is only one event input to the gate of event 1 . So we
can collapse 1 and 2 into 12 in Figure 4.7 (B). Event 13 is just event 3 with
a different name3.
By definition, Use(“perform s”) contains all and only the input artifacts of the
step s; “s-STARTED is the only vertex immediately precedes “perform s”; and for the
2According to the copy-in-copy-out semantics of parameter passing in Little-JIL, if a leaf step is
terminated, the value of the parameter that it changes will not be copied out.
3As mentioned before, the addition of the vertex “perform s” is just for the purpose of easy
understand the approach’s application to Little-JIL. The actual implementation does not have this
vertex addition.
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simplification desceribed above (Figure 4.3), we can collapse events 8 9 10 11 into
the event 18 . Lastly, the event 17 is just 7 with slightly different name.
We call such an elaboration in Figure 4.7 (B) Template LS-1.
Figure 4.7. Template LS-1 For Event Type “b is incorrect when s is COMPLETED”
When b Is An Output Artifact Of Leaf Step s.
For example, in the “Issue ballot and get vote” Little-JIL process, at some point
when deriving the fault tree, we encounter the event “ ‘ballot @ issue regular’ is
incorrect when ‘issue regular’ is COMPLETED”. Since ‘ballot @ issue regular’ is the
output artifact of the leaf step ‘issue regular’, we apply Template LS-1 to elaborate
the event as shown in Figure 4.8. Note that the step ‘issue regular’ does not have any
input, so this elaboration yields only one intermediate event “execution incorrectly
reaches ‘issue regular-STARTED’ ”.
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Figure 4.8. Elaborating “ ‘ballot @ issue regular’ is incorrect when ‘issue regular’ is
COMPLETED” Using Template LS-1.
In cases that s is not a leaf step or b is not an output of s, the elaborations are
straight forward using the templates in the SP set.
4.1.2.4 Template LS-2: s incorrectly throws exception e
A Little-JIL step’s specification can contain exceptions the step may throw during
its execution. A non-leaf step may throw exceptions propagated from its sub-steps.
The decision of whether an exception is thrown from a leaf step depends totally on
the agent performing the step. Then the leaf step incorrectly throwing exception
might be caused by:
• one of the inputs into the step being incorrect,
• the agent’s misperformance.
Figure 4.9 shows the template LS-2 to elaborate the event “s incorrectly throws
exception e”. Figure 4.10 shows an example of applying the template to elaborate
the event “ ‘verify not-voted’ incorrectly throws AlreadyVoted” when deriving the
initial FT for the “Issue ballot and get vote” Little-JIL process model.
A similar template for elaborating “s incorrectly does not throw exception e” is
shown in the Appendix C.1.
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Figure 4.9. Template LS-2 For Event Type “s incorrectly throws exception e”.
Figure 4.10. Applying LS-2 to Elaborate “ ‘verify not-voted’ incorrectly throws
AlreadyVoted”.
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4.2 Case Studies On Four Little-JIL Processes
We evaluated the approach on four different processes which were modeled in
Little-JIL. In this section, we briefly describe the processes, then present our findings.
4.2.1 Four Little-JIL Processes Used In The Approach’s Evaluation
We used models of four different real-world processes in our approach’s evaluation.
These process models are the result of extensive process elicitation done by analysts;
they shadowed the performers of the processes and interviewed domain experts to
capture the real-world processes as closely as possible. These process models have
been used in other analyses and have been described in published papers (see [2,6,7,
25].)
The first process is the “Issue ballot and get vote” (IB) process that we use from
the beginning to illustrate the approach. It involves the voter authentication, the
issue of an appropriate ballot, and the casting of votes. The failure is that a voter
casts his/her votes with an incorrect ballot.
The second process we used in our evaluation is the “Count votes” (CV) process,
also in the election domain. Like the IB process model, the CV process model is
also based on the real-world election process at Yolo County, California. To count
the votes, election officials first count votes in each precinct then add each precinct’s
result into the total counts, then perform a random audit (manual recount of 1% of
ballot to ensure consistency), and then, finally, if no exceptions are raised, report final
vote totals to Secretary of State. A recount of all ballots is performed if the random
audit raises any exception. The failure being analyzed is “the incorrect vote totals
are reported to Secretary of State”. Figure 4.11 shows the top level of the Little-JIL
model of the CV process.
The third and forth processes are in the medical domain: “Chemotherapy” (CM)
and “In-patient blood transfusion” (BT) processes.
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count votes
count votes from all precincts report final vote totals to Secretary of State 
perform ballot and vote count
perform reconciliations scan votes confirm tallies match handle discrepancyadd vote count to vote total
manually count votes
perform random audit
select precincts for 1% mandatory manual audit confirm audit tallies are consistentmanually count votes
recount votesinitialize counts securely store election artifacts
count votes from precinct
+
               may throw
VoteCountInconsistentException
done separately
per precinct
                 may throw
VoteCountInconsistentException
continues after handling
VoteCountInconsistentException
Figure 4.11. Little-JIL Process Model Of “Count votes”.
prepare for and administer first cycle of chemotherapy
perform consultation and assessment perform initial review of patient records perform pharmacy tasks obtain patient informed consent perform final pharmacy tasks
first day of chemo
prepare chemotherapy drugs administer chemotherapy drugs
create and process consult note
dictate consult note transcribe and place consult note in patient's record
perform chemotherapy process
consider alternative treatment
refer patient to an oncologist
perform initial review of patient records
perform pharmacy tasks
obtain patient informed consent
perform final pharmacy tasks
transcribe and place consult note in patient's record
consider alternative treatment
install portacath
install portacath
?
New Post It 19
Prerequisite:
refer patient to an oncologist
agent: Pharmacist agent: clinic RN
<=> consultation channel
takes from "consultation channel"
agents: clinic MA, oncologist
throws
PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer
....... ....... .......
on the day before
administering
chemotherapy
agent: Practice RN agent: Pharmacist agent: Nurse Practitioner agent: Nurse Practitioner agent: Pharmacist
complete
Figure 4.12. Little-JIL Process Model Of “Chemotherapy”.
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The CM process model (Figure 4.12) covers multiple phases of the chemotherapy
process, which includes diagnosing the patient and ordering chemotherapy; thorough
review of the treatment plan and medication orders by a medical assistant, a nurse,
and a pharmacist; conducting an informational/teaching session with the patient and
obtaining an informed consent form; preparing chemotherapy drugs, performed by a
pharmacist and pharmacy technicians; and assessing the patient and administering
the drugs, performed by a nurse. The failure to be analyzed is “incorrect drugs are
administered to the patient”.
perform in-patient blood transfusion
carry out physician order for transfusion
prepare documentation for blood pick-up perform follow through checkpick up blood from blood bank perform transfusioncheck for existence of type and screen
+
Pre: confirm physician order for blood transfusion
The agent type (i.e Nurse) is specified here
and the rest of the substeps inherit the
agent from their parent step.
uses SpecimenLabeling and
VPID modules
Figure 4.13. Little-JIL Process Model Of “In-patient blood transfusion”.
The BT model defines the blood transfusion process, which includes the following:
the nurse confirming there is an order from the physician to transfuse blood to a
patient, verifying the patient’s ID, getting the blood product from the blood bank,
and administering the blood product to the patient. The failure to be analyzed is
“incorrect blood product is administered to the patient”.
All of the above processes are defined in Little-JIL and translated to appropriate
CFGs to be used with our approach. The four processes vary in size (number of steps,
thus number of CFG vertices and edges) and number of artifacts as shown later.
For each case study, we applied the simple templates to generate the initial FT,
computed the initial cut sets and MCSs. For each initial cut set, we applied the
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detailed templates to generate the elaborated FT, computed its cut sets and MCSs.
We then collected all elaborated FTs (some of them were duplicates as expected) and
removed duplications, so the result was unique elaborated cut sets; we also computed
the elaborated MCSs from those unique elaborated cut sets.
4.2.2 Findings
By applying the two-phase approach of FTA to the four process models with
corresponding failure specifications, we have found that:
1. Using the detailed templates led to scenarios that completely specified the paths
through the process that could result in the failure.
2. Some spurious cut sets could be automatically identified and therefore elimi-
nated.
3. The size of the results of FTA, in terms of the numbers of initial cut sets, of
elaborated cut sets and and of MCSs depended on multiple factors, including
the overall number of failure-influencing variables, the number of such variables
input to a step, the number of steps that have multiple of such inputs, and the
complexity of the control flow to the failure steps.
4. As expected, using all available control and data dependence information re-
sulted in a larger number of MCSs for the domain experts to examine. We
discovered MCSs that were not found before using Chen’s approach. These
MCSs fell into two categories: in one category, the MCSs elaborated on MCSs
previously found using Chen’s approach, detailing how the process execution
could reach the error-making steps; in the second category, the MCSs repre-
sented failure causes in which some steps were executed while they should not
have been executed. MCSs in the second category were found by our approach
by exploiting control dependence information in process models. The larger
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number of MCSs, however, could be overwhelming to users. We suggested four
techniques that could be used to make the FTA result more manageable.
In this section, we describe the above findings in more details.
4.2.2.1 Using the detailed templates led to scenarios that completely
specified the paths through the process that could result in the
failure.
As described in the Approach Chapter, we first generated the initial FT for each
case, computed its initial cut sets and elaborated each initial cut set to view its
elaborated FT and elaborated cut sets. An example of such incremental exploration
of the IB process was described earlier (section 3.3).
Below is another example, taken from the CV process. In the first stage, the
initial FT was derived, its cut sets were computed. One of the initial cut sets is:
CS-1:
• ‘recount votes’ produces incorrect recountedVoteTotals due to agent’s mis-
performance
The step ‘recount votes’ is not on the normal process execution path. If the
vote counting and auditing went without any exception, ‘recount votes’ would not
be executed. This initial cut set (which was also produced as an MCS using Chen’s
approach) did not explain how the execution could get to ‘recount votes’. So in
the second phase, we derived the elaborated FT using the detailed template. The
elaborated cut sets showed multiple ways how the execution could first reach ‘recount
votes’, then the agent performing ‘recount votes’ produced an incorrect output; all
of these led to the failure “ totalTallies input to ‘report vote totals to Secretary of
State’ is incorrect”. One such a way to reach ‘recount votes’ and produce incorrect
vote counts is shown in the following elaborated cut set:
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CS-1-1:
• ‘confirm audit tallies are consistent’ incorrectly throws
VoteCountInconsistentException due to agent’s misperformance
• ‘recount votes’ produces incorrect recountedVoteTotals due to agent’s mis-
performance
It is not easy to see that in order for the step ‘recount votes’ to be executed, the
step ‘confirm audit tallies are consistent’ has to throw the exception
VoteCountInconsistentException, either correctly or incorrectly (in the above ex-
ample, the exception was thrown incorrectly due to the agent’s misperformance). In
the case the exception is thrown incorrectly, we, however, could not automatically in-
fer from the Little-JIL process definition what caused the exception to be thrown. The
users might only able to infer from the exception name, VoteCountInconsistent-
Exception, that the vote counts were somehow inconsistent, therefore the exception
was thrown. This Little-JIL language feature, leaving the decision of throwing excep-
tion to the agent performing the step, is a strength (allowing abstraction), but also a
weakness (inhibiting automatic inference); we discuss this matter more in Section 4.4.
Using this incremental approach with the simple templates in the first phase and
the detailed templates in the second phase did not only produce a more accurate
result (an error has to happen in certain conditions in order to cause the failure), but
also appeared to provide better understanding of the real causes of the failure.
4.2.2.2 Some spurious cut sets could be automatically identified and
therefore eliminated
The spurious cut set identification algorithm introduced in section 3.6 was able to
identify spurious cut sets in only one of the four cases — the IB process. Table 4.1
shows the result.
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Table 4.1. Evaluation Result: Spurious Cut Set Identification.
Process
# cut sets
before elimination
# identified spurious
cut sets
percentage
IB 429 96 22%
CV 57505 0 0%
CM 183 0 0%
BT 355 0 0%
In the IB process case study, 96 out of 429 unique elaborated cut sets were found
to be spurious, according to the algorithm, i.e., 22% reduction in the number of cut
sets. All of the identified spurious cut sets in the IB process were conforming to the
pattern described in the example in section 3.6.
In other case studies, because of the nature of the processes, there were no cut
sets fitting the “profile” of spuriousness that the algorithm aims to identify, that
is: in the execution path corresponding to the events in the cut set4, at the first
branching vertex, taking the correct branch definitely leads to a specific step S without
encountering any failure-influencing labels, while taking the incorrect branch also
definitely leads to S without encountering any failure-influencing labels along the
way; and from S to the end of the execution, no further error occurs. Generally, if a
process has multiple checks with two possible outcomes: one outcome is when all the
checks pass, and the other is when any of the checks fails, then there will be spurious
cut sets identified by the algorithm.
4.2.2.3 The result size depended on multiple factors
We consider several measures of the result size: the numbers of initial cut sets,
of initial MCSs, of unique elaborated cut sets, and of elaborated MCSs. In addition
to the four process models mentioned above, we created a variation of the “Count
4The path that contains all of the events in the cut set.
100
votes” process, called CV2, by removing the artifact coverSheet from all the steps.
The purpose is to compare the result size when there is a difference in the number of
failure-influencing variables and everything else is the same.
Table 4.2 shows the result sizes of all of the case studies. The charts in Figure 4.14
show the comparisons in terms of process models’ CFG sizes (numbers of vertices and
of edges) and the FTA result sizes (numbers of initial MCSs and of elaborated MCSs).
In the IB process, there are two places where the process’s CFG branches out,
corresponding to the two Little-JIL steps in the process that might throw exceptions
— ‘verify registered’ and ‘verify not-voted’ — hence the number of edges is one more
than the number of vertices (see Figure 4.1 and Figure 2.6). Similarly, for the CV and
CV2 processes, each also has two such steps — ‘confirm tallies match’ and ‘confirm
audit tallies are consistent’ — hence the number of edges is one more than the number
of vertices (see Figure 4.11 ). The CM process has four and the BT process has more
than 20 such steps.
We observe that the size of the CFG in terms of numbers of vertices and edges
does not seem to have a much clear effect on the FTA result size. The CM pro-
cess’ CFG has more vertices and edges than the CFG of the IB or the CV pro-
cesses, but the CM’s FTA result is smaller than the FTA result of the other pro-
cesses. The BT process had a much larger CFG compared to the rest of the pro-
cesses but its FTA result was much smaller, especially compared to the CV pro-
cesses. On the other hand, BT had fewer failure-influencing variables: bloodProduct,
bloodTypeAndScreen, and bloodProductDocument; only one step had two of those
inputs (“release blood product from blood bank” with inputs bloodProductDocument
and bloodTypeAndScreen). CV had five failure-influencing variables: tallies, total-
Tallies, coverSheet, paperTrail, and voteRepository; many steps had multiple
of those artifacts as inputs. The number of failure-influencing variables in the process
appears to play a large role in the FA result size.
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Table 4.2. Evaluation Result: Result Size Comparison.
Process
CFG #
failure-
influencing
variables
Result
# vertices # edges
#
initial
CSs
#
initial
MCSs
#
elaborated
CSs
#
elaborated
MCSs
IB 26 27 3 15 15 333 25
CM 60 63 2 10 9 183 19
BT 315 339 3 10 10 345 74
CV 48 49 5 29 29 57505 357
CV2 48 49 4 27 27 12615 220
To investigate this further, we compared CV and CV2, we saw that by having one
fewer failure-influencing variable (coverSheet), CV2’s FTA result was reduced by 7%
in the number of initial MCSs (27 vs. 29), and by 38% in the number of elaborated
MCSs (220 vs. 357).
There are multiple factors that seem to affect the FTA result size:
1. The overall number of failure-influencing variables,
2. The complexity of the control flow to the failure steps, how many paths there
are to the failure steps or size of the control dependence set (CD) of the failure
steps,
3. The number of failure-influencing variables input to a step,
4. The number of steps that have multiple failure-influencing inputs.
Future research would be needed to analyze the actual effects of these factors and
maybe other factors on the FTA result size.
4.2.2.4 Using all available control and data dependence information re-
sulted in a larger number of MCSs for the domain experts to
examine
As explained the in the Approach Chapter, the new two-phase approach exploits
available control and data flow information to provide more details to the FTA result,
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C. Number of MCSs depends on multiple factors 
• BT has a larger CFG but less hazard-dependent 
artifacts, compared to CV.  
– BT: blood product, blood type & screen, blood product 
document. Only one step has 2 of those inputs (“release 
blood product from blood bank” with inputs blood product 
document and blood type and screen.) 
– CV: tallies, total tallies, cover sheet, paper trail, vote 
repository. Many steps have multiple inputs. 
• CV vs. CV2: removing 1 input to the process (cover 
sheet) considerably reduces the number of MCSs 
(see table).  
Process 
CFG 
#Dependent 
Artifacts 
New approach 
#Vertices #Edges 
#MCSs-
initial 
#MCS-
elaborated 
IB 26 27 3 15 35 
CM 60 63 2 9 19 
BT 315 339 3 10 74 
CV 48 49 5 29 357 
CV2 48 49 4 27 220 
1 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
IB CM BT CV CV2
CFG #Vertices
CFG #Edges
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
IB CM BT CV CV2
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Figure 4.14. Evaluation Result: Result Size Comparison.
Table 4.3. Evaluation Result: More MCSs To Examine.
Process
Chen’s Approach 2-phase Approach
# MCSs # initial MCSs # elaborated MCSs
IB 2 15 35
CM 2 9 19
BT 5 10 74
CV 7 29 357
CV2 6 27 220
especially the control dependence information. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.15 show that
in each case study our new FTA approach provided many more initial MCSs and
elaborated MCSs than Chen’s approach did.
We obviously discovered MCSs that were not identified using Chen’s approach. For
example, in the IB process, Chen’s approach only found two MCSs, both were single-
points-of-failure: one was {“Step ‘issue regular ballot’ produces wrong ballot”}, and
the other was {“Step ‘issue provisional ballot’ produces wrong ballot”}. Those two
MCSs were identified as two of the cut sets from our initial FT. We elaborated each of
those two initial cut sets, such that the resulting elaborated cut sets showed how the
process execution reached the error steps (‘issue regular ballot’ in the first initial cut
set, and ‘issue provisional ballot’ in the second initial cut set). Our final MCSs were
extracted from the elaborated cut sets. Our approach identified, in addition to those
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Figure 4.15. Evaluation Result: Comparing With Chen’s Approach.
Initial 
CS 
#elaborated Cut-
Sets 
#elaborated 
MCSs 
1 8 5 
2 52 5 
3 4 1 
4 38 5 
5 4 2 
6 44 10 
7 104 25 
8 4 1 
9 44 10 
10 44 10 
11 44 10 
12 4 2 
13 4 2 
14 104 25 
15 4 2 
Initial 
CS 
#elaborated 
Cut-Sets 
#elaborated 
MCSs 
1 32 9 
2 16 3 
3 46 6 
4 60 9 
5 32 6 
6 92 18 
7 46 6 
8 16 3 
9 64 18 
10 32 6 
Initial 
CS 
#elaborated 
Cut-Sets 
#elaborated 
MCSs 
1 64 16 
2 178 1 
3 128 32 
4 178 1 
5 128 32 
6 64 16 
7 128 32 
8 128 32 
9 192 40 
10 192 40 
Initial 
CS 
#elaborated Cut-
Sets 
#elaborated 
MCSs 
1 3288 23 
2 1040 12 
3 1480 6 
4 616 2 
5 1344 12 
6 1248 6 
7 616 2 
8 1344 12 
9 2488 36 
10 1644 1 
11 1040 12 
12 1668 4 
13 744 1 
14 3288 46 
15 3288 23 
16 1480 6 
17 744 1 
18 1248 6 
IB CM BT CV 
Figure 4.16. Evaluation Result: Initial CSs and Corresponding Numbers of Elabo-
rated CSs and MCSs.
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two initial cut sets, many more initial cut sets and then elaborated MCSs that exposed
the causes of the failure, including errors made by agents in the authentication steps
(‘verify registered’, or ‘verify not-voted’), or errors in the artifacts (voterName, or
votingRoll), etc.
In the CM process, Chen’s approach found only two MCSs: one was {“Step ‘pre-
pare chemotherapy drugs’ produces wrong chemo drug”}, and the other was { “Step
‘create chemotherapy orders’ produces wrong chemo orders”, “Step ‘perform initial
review of patient record’ does not throw exception PracticeRNFindsProblemWithOrders”,
“Step ‘perform pharmacy tasks’ does not throw exception
PharmacistFindsProblemWithOrders”}. In addition to those initial cut sets and
their elaborated MCSs, we found others, here is an example:
• ‘confirm pathology report indicates cancer’ incorrectly does not throw Pathol-
ogyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer due to agent’s misperformance
• ‘perform initial review of patient record’ correctly does not throw PracticeRN-
FindsProblemWithOrders
• ‘perform pharmacy tasks’ correctly does not throw PharmacistFindsProb-
lemWithOrders
The above MCS exposed the possible causes of the system failure in which the error
made by the oncologist who performed the step ‘confirm pathology report indicates
cancer’5 (incorrectly not throwing the PathologyReportDoesNotIndicateCancer ex-
ception) eventually led to the execution of the step ‘administer chemotherapy drugs’,
which should have not been executed in the first place, hence the failure.
Having more MCSs (and even more cut sets) in the result, however, appeared
to be overwhelming, especially in the case of the CV process. Figure 4.16 shows, for
5Step “confirm pathology report indicates cancer” is a sub-step of “perform consultation and
assessment” shown in the CM’s Little-JIL model in Figure 4.12.
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each process, the initial cut sets (CSs) and their corresponding numbers of elaborated
CSs and MCSs. For example, in IB process, the elaboration of the initial cut set #1
resulted in 8 elaborated CSs, 5 of which were MCSs. In CV process, the number of
elaborated CSs of a single initial CS went up to more than 3,000 which seems very
unmanageable.
To make the FTA result more accessible to users, we suggest the following:
1. Allow users to specify events that do not have to be considered because they
are regarded as too unlikely to occur. We call them unlikely events.
2. Allow even more incremental exploration by parameterizing the depth of fault
tree elaboration.
3. Group cut sets into equivalence classes.
4. Present only MCSs, and show CSs up on request.
Below we discuss each of the above suggestions in more detail.
4.2.2.4.1 Allow specification of unlikely events. Domain experts might spec-
ify some events that are unlikely to happen, so they can be removed from consider-
ation. For example, in the CV case study, if the event “coverSheet input to process
is incorrect” was specified as unlikely, the FTA result size could be substantially re-
duced (by almost 80% in the number of unique elaborated CSs, about 40% in the
number of elaborated MCSs, see Table 4.4).
We applied some specification of unlikely events, one for each case study, as shown
in Figure 4.17. The unlikely events were chosen randomly6. The result sizes were
reduced considerably in all cases. Further experiments that specify other randomly
6We did not know in advance how often those events appeared in the cut sets before the unlikely-
event specification. Obviously, the more cut sets the event appears in, the more the number of cut
sets is reduced when the event is specified to be unlikely.
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Table 4.4. Specifying Unlikely Events To Reduce Result Size.
Process
#
initial
CSs
# unique
elaborated
CSs
Across all initial CSs
Average #
of
elaborated
CSs
Average #
of
elaborated
MCSs
Max #
of elaborated
MCSs
CV
(original)
29 57505 9263 45 180
CV’
(with unlikely event specs)
27 12615 2019 28 108
CV’ vs. CV -7% -78% -78% -39% -40%
chosen events to be unlikely should be carried out to verify the effectiveness of this
suggestion.
Reduction in # of initial CSs 
Process Original 
With unlikely 
event specs 
Reduction  
IB 15 11 -27% 
CM 10 9 -10% 
BT 10 9 -10% 
CV 29 27 -7% 
Reduction in # of unique elaborated CSs 
Process Original 
With unlikely 
event specs 
 Reduction 
IB 333 57 -83% 
CM 183 91 -50% 
BT 345 153 -56% 
CV 57505 12615 -78% 
Unlikely events (arbitrary choice): 
• IB: votingRoll input to the process is 
incorrect 
• CM: "perform pharmacy tasks" 
incorrectly does not throw 
PharmacistFindsProblemWithOrders due 
to agent's misperformance 
• BT: "prepare documentation for blood 
pick up" produces incorrect 
bloodProductDoc due to agent's 
misperformance 
• CV: coverSheet input to the process is 
incorrect 
 
Figure 4.17. Specifying Unlikely Events To Reduce Result Size In All Cases.
4.2.2.4.2 Allow even more incremental exploration by parameterizing the
depth of fault tree elaboration. Recall the algorithm for elaborating a fault tree:
we iteratively apply appropriate templates to elaborate all existing leaf events that
are not primary events until all leaf events are primary. In each iteration, we increase
one more level of elaboration. We call the number of iterations the elaboration depth.
We speculated that by limiting the elaboration depth, the numbers of CSs and MCSs
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in the result were not as many compared to those in unlimited-depth elaboration.
To confirm the speculation, we performed the FT elaboration with various depths on
the CV process. The result is shown in Figure 4.18. There were 29 CSs in the initial
FT. The graph shows the number of elaborated CSs for each of the 29 initial CSs in
three cases, varied by the elaboration depths: Full (unlimited depth), Depth=3 and
Depth=1.
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Figure 4.18. Parameterizing Elaboration Depth To Control Result Size.
4.2.2.4.3 Group cut sets into equivalence classes. Cut sets can be parti-
tioned into groups given an equivalence relation. Here is an example of an equivalence
relation: Two cut sets are equivalent if they have the same set of error events. Recall
that events in cut sets are primary events and some of them are not error events:
• Branch condition (predicate p correctly holds). In Little-JIL, we have: Step S
correctly throws / does not throw exception E.
• Consequence event (v produces incorrect b due to input a). In Little-JIL, we
have: Step S produces incorrect b due to input a; Step S incorrectly throws/
does not throw exception E due to input a.
Error events in cut sets are of the following types:
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• v is performed incorrectly producing incorrect b. In Little-JIL: Step S produces
incorrect b due to agent’s misperformance; Step S incorrectly throws / does not
throw exception E due to agent’s misperformance.
• a input to the system is incorrect. In Little-JIL: a is incorrect when ROOT step
is POSTED.
Figure 4.19 shows an example in the CV case study of two cut sets belonging to
the same group because they have the same set of error events.
--- Group 9 --- 
{ 
"recount votes" produces incorrect recountedVoteTotals due to agent's misperformance 
paperTrail is incorrect when "count votes" is posted 
} 
 
--- containing 2 cut sets:  
{ 
"confirm audit tallies are consistent" incorrectly throws VoteCountInconsistentException due to incorrect input tallies 
"confirm tallies match" incorrectly does not throw VoteCountInconsistentException due to incorrect input tallies 
"recount votes" produces incorrect recountedVoteTotals due to agent's misperformance 
"scan votes" produces incorrect tallies due to incorrect input paperTrail 
paperTrail is incorrect when "count votes" is posted 
} 
 
{ 
"confirm audit tallies are consistent" incorrectly throws VoteCountInconsistentException 44 due to incorrect input tallies 
"confirm tallies match" correctly throws VoteCountInconsistentException 
"manually count votes" produces incorrect tallies due to incorrect input paperTrail 
"recount votes" produces incorrect recountedVoteTotals due to agent's misperformance 
paperTrail is incorrect when "count votes" is posted 
} 
Figure 4.19. Grouping Cut Sets.
We experimented with grouping on the CV process. Table 4.5 shows the result
across all the initial cut sets. On average, the number of cut set groups (203 CS
groups) is only 2.2% of the number of elaborated CSs (9263 CSs), and the number
of MCS groups (15 MCS groups) is only 34% of the number of MCSs (45 MCSs).
We noted that with this grouping, each group could correspond to more than one
scenario (the example above). So even though the grouping allowed users to focus
on error events, elaboration on the grouping to reveal all corresponding scenarios is
necessary to provide users with better understanding of the vulnerabilities.
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Table 4.5. Grouping CSs And MCSs In CV Process.
# elaborated CSs # elaborated MCSs # CS groups # MCS groups
AVG 9263 45 203 15
MAX 20284 180 320 44
MIN 1832 1 104 1
4.2.2.4.4 Present only MCSs, and show CSs up on request. As seen in
Figure 4.16, the numbers of MCSs in the result are less overwhelming. So if we
present the result by showing only MCSs, and present CSs only upon user’s request,
it might be a better user experience. Another suggestion is to present all CSs, but
sort the CSs by their minimality and then by the number of error events in each CS.
This allows users to easily focus their effort on what might be more important.
4.3 Summary
In summary, we found that the approach was promising but inherited several
limitations and thus needed more improvement. First of all, we saw that using the
detailed templates led to scenarios that completely specified the paths through the
process that could result in the failure. Second, some spurious cut sets could be
automatically identified and therefore eliminated. However, it was quite unexpected
that among four case studies, the approach only identified spurious cut sets in only
one case (IB process). We have not yet identified (even manually) spurious cut sets
in other processes. One should investigate more if spurious cut set elimination is
desirable. Third, we found that the number of elaborated CSs (and MCSs) depended
on multiple factors, not necessarily on the CFG size. The most likely factor was the
number of failure-influencing variables overall and per step. And finally, we found that
using all available control and data dependence information resulted in a much larger
number of MCSs for the domain experts to examine. We made some suggestions to
make result less overwhelming to users.
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4.4 Little-JIL’s Abstraction Posing Limits On Our Fault Tree
Derivation
The Little-JIL definition language highlights the use of abstractions, but as a
consequence, it limits our FT derivation as follows.
First, a leaf step in Little-JIL definition is only defined by its interface, including
the inputs, outputs, agent, and possible exceptions. The step specification does not
define how the outputs are computed from the inputs. Therefore we have to assume
each output depends on all of the inputs. Thus, leaf steps that do not satisfy this
assumption will cause the derived fault tree to contain incorrect sub-trees. We were
able to annotate leaf steps with output-input dependence information, so that the
derived fault trees were more accurate. However, it is desirable to have a feature in
the language to specify the output-input dependence information.
Second, in Little-JIL, when a step is declared to have an exception, the decision of
whether or not to throw the exception during the process execution depends on the
agent performing that step. For example, the step ‘confirm audit tallies are consis-
tent’ is defined with an exception VoteCountInconsistentException. This Little-JIL
language feature allows procedural abstraction; the details of how it is decided that
the exception has to be thrown are omitted. However, as mentioned in Section 4.2.2.1,
this feature also inhibits automatic inference of the fault tree events of type “step S
correctly throws exception E”, which usually are the cases when something goes wrong
thus the process has to deviate from its normal execution path. With no further de-
tails provided in the process definition about which cases the exception should be
thrown, we cannot automatically infer those cases and further derive the fault tree,
we have to treat those events “step S correctly throws exception E” as primary events.
111
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) has been widely used in various industries to study
failures of complex systems, either after the fact or as a preventive measure. We are
interested in the latter — identifying causes of potential system failures — so that
modifications can be made to the system designs to reduce the possibility of such
failures.
FTA is a deductive, top-down analysis technique that aims to determine the vari-
ous combinations of hardware and software faults and human errors that could cause
a specified undesired event representing a system failure. Given a specified undesired
event, FTA produces a fault tree (FT) and computes its cut sets — combinations of
events that could lead to the occurrence of the undesired event at the top of the tree,
referred to as the top event.
Straightforward Boolean algebra can be used to compute a FT’s cut sets, but the
construction of the FT itself is still an on-going problem. As manual FT construc-
tion is time consuming and prone to errors, work has been done to automate the
FT construction for various system models. Previous approaches to automatic FT
construction, however, are mostly language dependent; they are limited to systems
modeled in specific languages. Some of these types of models do not carry data or
control dependence information, or even if they do (Pascal, ADA, Little-JIL), control
dependence information is not fully exploited, therefore FTs produced by the respec-
tive FT construction approaches are incomplete. There is little evidence that these
approaches have been applied to non-trivial systems; only simple systems were shown
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in the papers presenting the approaches. Once a FT is constructed and its cut sets
are computed, the cut sets alone often do not provide enough information to show
users how events in a cut set together can cause the top event. At the same time,
there might be too many cut sets to be useful, especially when systems are large and
complex. Moreover, previous FTA approaches do not seem to attend to false positives
— cut sets that in fact do not cause the top event.
In this thesis, we investigated a systematic two-phase approach to identifying
causes of potential system failures using FTA as follows:
• Phase 1: Given a system model and an undesired event representing a system
failure, we first use data and control dependence information from the system
model to automatically derive a high-level FT, called the initial FT, whose top
event is the undesired event; and then present users with the cut sets, called
the initial cut sets, from the initial FT.
• Phase 2: Users can then select one initial cut set for more detailed analysis. This
analysis considers additional control dependence information and combinations
of possible errors to generate an elaborated FT that focuses on the initial cut
set of interest. This second phase produces as its final result concrete scenarios,
each of which is a system execution path that contains all the events in a cut
set of the elaborated FT, showing how the events in the cut set could lead to
the top event.
System models used in this approach are control flow graphs (CFGs) and since
most system modeling languages can be translated to CFG, therefore this approach
is generally applicable.
To evaluate this approach, we applied it to several systems in the medical and
election domains. These systems have been subjects of other projects [7, 8, 28] to
model and analyze human-intensive processes. Although being called “processes”,
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they are in fact “systems” in our approach. The systems are modeled in Little-JIL,
a modeling language with expressive and well-defined semantics so that the resulting
models can be analyzed rigorously. Even though these system models are relatively
small, they are useful because they were carefully defined with the help from domain
expert in order to closely reflect the real-world systems.
By applying the two-phase FTA approach to the four systems with corresponding
system failures, we found that:
1. Using the detailed templates led to scenarios that completely specified the paths
through the system model that could result in the failure. This finding confirms
the usability of the approach which is to help users better understand the causes
of the failures.
2. Some spurious cut sets could be automatically identified and therefore elimi-
nated. However, among the four systems, we only discovered spurious cut sets
in one system. Our algorithm did not find spurious cut sets in the other sys-
tems. The reason is the other three systems do not have the control flows that
fit the “profile” of spuriousness that the algorithm is aiming to identify.
More work can be done in this area to develop more refined algorithms to
identify different types of spurious cut sets.
3. There were multiple factors that affected the number of cut sets in the FTA
results. Those factors included the overall number of failure-dependent data
items, the number of such data items input to a control flow graph’s vertex,
the number of vertices that have multiple failure-dependent inputs, and the
complexity of the control flow to the failure vertices.
4. Using all available control and data dependence information resulted in a larger
number of cut sets for the domain experts to examine. We discovered cut sets
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that were not found before in the previous Chen’s approach. The larger number
of cut sets, however, could be overwhelming to users.
We suggested and performed some preliminary exploration of some techniques
that could be used to make the FTA result more manageable:
1. Allow users to specify events that do not have to be considered because they
are regarded as too unlikely to occur,
2. Allow even more incremental exploration by parameterizing the depth of fault
tree elaboration,
3. Group cut sets into equivalence classes,
4. Present only minimal cut sets, and show cut sets up on request.
Future work should include more thorough evaluation of the above suggested
techniques and more investigation into other techniques to help manage the easily-
overwhelming FTA results.
Other areas for future work include: considering systems with concurrency and
examining other techniques to manage loops in system models. In case of using loop
unrolling, the user would have to choose a bound, and that choice may not be easy
to make. We unrolled loops twice in our evaluation and the future work should also
investigate other bounds and compare the results.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN DF AND SP
TEMPLATE SETS
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Two fault trees T1 and T2 are said to be equivalent if and only if they have the
same set of cut sets. We write T1 ∼= T2.
Given a fault tree T , a subtree of T is a tree consisting of an event in T and all
of its descendants in T .
Suppose we have two fault trees T and T ′ that are identical, except for the elab-
oration of an event E in both T and T ′. The subtree in T with top event E is called
TE, while the subtree in T
′ with top event E is called T ′E. It is easy to see that if
TE ∼= T ′E then T ∼= T ′.
In deriving a fault tree T given a top event H, a template is applied to elaborate
an intermediate event E of a specific type, generating a fault tree TE whose top
event is E. Each resulting fault tree TE is a subtree of current version T (still being
elaborated).
The two sets of templates DF and SP are the same except for two templates: DF-2
and SP-2 for the event “input into v is incorrect”, DF-4 and SP-4 for the event “b is
incorrect when entering v”. Therefore, in order to prove that the two sets generate
equivalent fault trees, we only need to show the following statements are correct:
S1(v): If the elaboration of “input into v is incorrect” using DF set
generates fault tree T1DF (v) and the elaboration of “input into v is incor-
rect” using SP set generates fault tree T1 SP (v) then T1DF (v) ∼= T1 SP (v).
S2(b,v): If the elaboration of “b is incorrect when entering v” using
DF set generates fault tree T2DF (b, v) and the elaboration of “b is incor-
rect when entering v” using SP set generates fault tree T2 SP (b, v) then
T2DF (b, v) ∼= T2 SP (b, v).
A.1 Proof of S1(v)
Let’s look at DF-2 (Fig. 3.4, page 43) to elaborate an event of type “input into
v is incorrect”. Basically the template iterates through all possible definitions that
reach v and are used as input in v.
Every time DF-2 is applied, a new intermediate event of type “a is incorrect when
exiting u” for each input a ∈ Use(v) is created. Note that by the construction of
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DF-2, either u is the not start vertex (implying a is defined at u) or u is the start
vertex. If u is not the start vertex, DF-3-case-2 (Fig. 3.5, page 3.5) will be applied
generating another event of type “input into u is incorrect” and then DF-2 is applied
again.
Only when we reach the event of type “a is incorrect when exiting u” and u is
the start vertex, then DF-3-case-1 can be applied, generating the primary event “a
input into the system is incorrect”, the fault tree elaboration terminates.
Informally, the template application along one branch of the fault tree, starting
from “input into v is incorrect” has this formulation DF-2 - (DF-3-case-2 - DF-2)* - DF-1
(the Kleene star * indicates 0 or more times).
Let L(v) be the maximum number of times that DF-2 has to be applied along one
tree branch before the elaboration terminates. For example, in Figure A.1, L(u1) = 1.
We are going to prove S1(v) by induction. We first prove that S1(v) is correct for
all v with L(v) = 1.
A.1.1 Proof of S1(v) - Base case: L(v) = 1
Case 1: There is only one element in IDD(v)
Suppose (au, P ) is the only element in IDD(v) — definition of a at u reaches v
via the path guided by P and a is used at v.
Suppose the path is u0 → u1 → ... → un where u0 ≡ u and un ≡ v1. And
along that path, there are m guarded edges (uk1 → uk1+1), ..., (ukm → ukm+1) with
0 ≤ m ≤ n, 0 ≤ ki < n. Without loss of generality, we assume ki < kj if i < j. Let
pi denote the predicate on the guarded edge (ui → ui+1).
In this case (Base Case 1), since (au, P ) is the only element in IDD(v), we can
infer that v has only one input a, and there is only one path guided by P from u to
v. Since L(v) = 1, u has to be the start vertex. Recall that u0 ≡ u and un ≡ v. So
1We use v1 ≡ v2 to denote v1 and v2 are the same vertex.
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in this Base Case 1 (L(v) = 1 and there is only one element in IDD(v)), u0 is the
start vertex.
A.1.1.0.5 Case 1.1: n = 1 and (u0 → u1) is not a guarded edge: In this
case, there is no predicate on the edge (u0 → u1).
• Using the DF template set: Applying DF-2 then DF-3-case-1 will generate the
fault tree T1DF (v) as in the left hand side of Figure A.1.
• Using the SP template set: Applying SP-2, SP-4, then DF-3-case-1 will generate
the fault tree T1 SP (v) as in the right hand side of Figure A.1.
In each fault tree in Figure A.1, the event “predicate p0 holds” is left there to show
full template DF-2, but it is shaded gray because (u0 → u1) is unguarded, there is no
such predicate.
Both of these trees have only one cut set, that is {“a input to the system is
incorrect”}.
A.1.1.0.6 Case 1.2: n = 1 and (u0 → u1) is a guarded edge: In this case,
there is predicate p0 on the edge (u0 → u1).
• Using the DF template set: Applying DF-2 then DF-3-case-1 will generate the
fault tree T1DF (v) as in the left hand side of Figure A.2.
• Using the SP template set: Applying SP-2, SP-4 and then DF-3-case-1 will
generate the fault tree T1 SP (v) as in the right hand side of Figure A.2.
Both of these trees have only one cut set, that is {“a input to the system is
incorrect”, “p0 holds”}.
A.1.1.0.7 Case 1.3: n > 1:
• Using the DF template set: Applying DF-2 then DF3-case-1 will generate the
the fault tree T1DF (v) as in the left hand side of Figure A.3.
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Figure A.1. Base Case 1.1. Elaboration of event “input to v is incorrect” with an
input a used at v and the definition of a from start reaches v via unguarded edge
(u→ v). LHS: T1DF (v). RHS: T1 SP (v).
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Figure A.2. Base Case 1.2. Elaboration of event “input to v is incorrect” with an
input a used at v and the definition of a from start reaches u1 via (u→ v) guarded
by predicate p0. LHS: T1DF (v). RHS: T1 SP (v).
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• Using the SP template set:
– First applying template SP-2 to the event “input to un is incorrect”, we
get “a is incorrect when entering un” . Then applying SP-4, we get “a
is incorrect when exiting un−1” and potentially primary event “predicate
pn−1 holds” if (un−1 → un) is a guarded edge (see Figure A.3).
– Obviously, because of the construction of IDD(v), we can see that a is never
defined at any ui, 0 < i < n. Therefore, since a is not defined at un−1,
template DF-3-case-3 can be applied to get “a is incorrect when entering
un−1”. Applying SP-4 again, we get “a is incorrect when exiting un−2”
and potentially primary event “predicate pn−2 holds” if (un−2 → un−1) is
a guarded edge.
– The two templates DF-3-case-3 and SP-4 are repeatedly applied until we
reach “a is incorrect when exiting u0”.
– Finally, since u0 ≡ start, DF-3-case-1 can be applied and we get the fault
tree T1 SP (v) as in the right hand side of Figure A.3.
Both of the trees T1DF (v) and T1 SP (v) have only one cut set, that is {“a input
to the system is incorrect”, “pk1 holds”,..., “pkm holds”}.
Case 2: IDD(v) has more than one element
Since we are still proving the base case of S1(v) with L(v) = 1, IDD(v) having more
than one element means that there are more than one variable defined at the start
vertex and used at v. We provide the proof for IDD(v) having two elements. The case
of more than two can be proved similarly. Suppose IDD(v) = {(au0 , P ), (a′u0 , P ′)},
u0 ≡ start.
• (au0 , P ) ∈ IDD(v) — a is used at v and the definition of a at u0 reaches v via the
path guided by P . Suppose the path is u0 → u1 → ...→ un where un ≡ v. And
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Figure A.3. Base Case 1.3. Elaboration of event “input to v is incorrect” with an
input a used at v and the definition of a from start reaches v via a path guided by
P = ∠u0, ..., un〉 with u0 ≡ start and un ≡ v. LHS: T1 (v)DF . RHS: T1 (v)SP .
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along that path, there are m guarded edges (uk1 → uk1+1), ..., (ukm → ukm+1)
with 0 ≤ m ≤ n, 0 ≤ ki < n. Let pi denote the predicate on the guarded edge
(ui → ui+1).
• (a′u0 , P ′) ∈ IDD(v) — a′ is used at v and the definition of a′ at u0 reaches v via
the path guided by P ′. Suppose the path is u0 → u′1 → ...→ u′n′ where u′n′ ≡ v.
And along that path, there are m′ guarded edges (u′k′1 → u
′
k′1+1
), ..., (u′k′
m′
→
u′k′
m′+1
) with 0 ≤ m′ ≤ n′, 0 ≤ k′i < n’. Let p′i denote the predicate on the
guarded edge (u′i → u′i+1).
Figure A.4. T1DF (v) Of Base Case 2. Elaboration of event “input to v is incorrect”
using the DF set, with v having two input a and a′ whose definitions come from the
start vertex via paths guided by P and P ′ respectively.
Figure A.4 and Figure A.5 show the elaboration of event “input to v is incorrect”
using the DF set and SP set respectively. Both fault trees T1DF (v) and T1 SP (v) have
two cut sets {“a input to the system is incorrect”, “pk1 holds”,..., “pkm holds”} and
{‘a input to the system is incorrect”, “p′k′1 holds”,..., “p
′
k′
m′
holds”}. In other words
T1DF (v) ∼= T1 SP (v).
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Figure A.5. T1 SP (v) Of Base Case 2. Elaboration of event “input to v is incorrect”
using the SP set with v having two input a and a′ whose definitions come from the
start vertex via paths guided by P and P ′ respectively.
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∴ S1(v) is correct for all v that have L(v) = 1. QED base case.
A.1.2 Proof of S1(v) - Induction case L(v) > 1
Assume S1(u) is correct with every vertex u that L(u) < t.
Let’s consider S1(v) with vertex v that L(v) = t. Again, first we prove that S1(v)
is correct when v has only one input a, and (au, P ) ∈ IDD(v) — the definition of a
at u reaches v via the path guided by P , and a is used at v. Suppose the path is
u0 → u1 → ... → un where u0 ≡ u and un ≡ v. And along that path, there are m
guarded edges (uk1 → uk1+1), ..., (ukm → ukm+1) with 0 ≤ m ≤ n, 0 ≤ ki < n. Let pi
denote the predicate on the guarded edge (ui → ui+1).
Similar to case 1 in section A.1.1:
• Using DF set, first DF-2 is applied. Since L(v) > 1, u0 is not the start vertex,
so DF-3-case-2 is applied next, generating “a output from u0 is incorrect”, then
DF-1 is applied next generating “input into u0 is incorrect”. Elaboration of
“input into u0 is incorrect” gives us the fault tree T1DF (u0) (see Figure A.6).
• Using SP set, first SP-2 then SP-4 are applied, then DF-3-case-3 and SP-4 are
repeatedly applied until we get to “a output from u0 is incorrect”, then DF-1 is
applied next generating “input into u0 is incorrect”. Elaboration of “input into
u0 is incorrect” gives us the fault tree T1 SP (u0).
Since both sets use the same template DF-5 to elaborate “execution incorrectly
reaches u0”, and T1DF (u0) ∼= T1 SP (u0) (because L(u0) = t − 1 and the induction
assumption says S1(v) is correct for all v with L(v) < t), we can see that the two fault
trees T ′DF and T
′
SP (surrounded by dashed rectangles in Figure A.6) are equivalent.
Suppose the same set of cut sets they have is C ′. Then, T1DF (v) and T1 SP (v) both
have the same set of cut sets C as follows:
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Figure A.6. Induction Case. Elaboration of event “input to v is incorrect” with an
input a used at v and the definition of a from u0 reaches v via a path guided by P .
u0 6= start LHS: T1DF (v). RHS: T1 SP (v).
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C = {C ∪ {“pk1holds”,...,“pkmholds”} | ∀C ∈ C ′}
∴ T1DF (v) ∼= T1 SP (v).
Similar proof can be done as in case 2 of section A.1.1 to show that S1(v) is correct
when L(v) = t and v has more than one input.
By induction, we have shown that S1(v) is correct for all v.
With the same reasoning, we can show that S2(v) is correct for all v.
Hence, we see that the two template sets generate equivalent fault trees. QED.
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APPENDIX B
PSEUDO-CODE FOR TEMPLATES
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input : event e of type “b output from v is incorrect”
output: newEvents– the new intermediate events generated from applying this template
newEvents ←− {};
create new OR gate orGate;
e.setGate(orGate);
// case 1: agent dependence
create new event eAgent of type “v is performed incorrectly producing incorrect b”;
orGate.addInEvent(eAgent);
// this is a primary event, not added to the newEvents set
// case 2: data dependence
create new event eData of type “input into v is incorrect”;
orGate.addInEvent(eData);
add eData to newEvents;
// case 3: control dependence
create new event eControl of type “execution incorrectly reaches v”;
orGate.addInEvent(eControl);
add eControl to newEvents;
Algorithm B.1: DF-1 Elaborate event “b output from v is incorrect”.
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input : event e of type “input to v is incorrect”
output: newEvents– the new intermediate events generated from applying this template
newEvents ←− {};
create new OR gate orGate;
e.setGate(orGate);
foreach (au, P ) in IDD( v) do
create new event eauP of type “input a to v from u via P is incorrect”;
orGate.addInEvent(eauP);
create new AND gate andGate;
eauP.setGate(andGate);
create new event eau of type “a is incorrect when exiting u”;
add eau to newEvents;
andGate.addInEvent(eau);
foreach ei in P do
create new event ep of type “predicate p(ei) holds”; andGate.addInEvent(ep);
// this event is primary in the initial fault tree, so it is not
added to the newEvents set.
Algorithm B.2: DF-2 Elaborate event “input into v is incorrect”.
input : event e of type “b is incorrect when exiting v”
output: newEvents– the new intermediate events generated from applying this template
newEvents ←− {};
create new OR gate orGate;
e.setGate(orGate);
if v == start vertex then
create new event eInput of type “b input to system is incorrect”;
orGate.addInEvent(eInput);
// this event is primary, so it is not added to the newEvents set.
else if b is output of v then
create new event eOutput of type “b output from v is incorrect”;
orGate.addInEvent(varOutputEvent);
add eOutput to newEvents;
else
// this is when v is not the start vertex and b is not output of v
create new event ePassing of type “b is incorrect when entering v”;
orGate.addInEvent(ePassing);
add ePassing to newEvents;
Algorithm B.3: DF-3 Elaborate event “b is incorrect when exiting v”.
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input : event e of type “b is incorrect when entering v”
output: newEvents– the new intermediate events generated from applying this template
newEvents ←− {};
create new OR gate orGate;
e.setGate(orGate);
foreach (bu,P) in IDD(b, v) do
create new event ebuP called “definition of b reaches v from u via P is incorrect”;
orGate.addInEvent(ebuP);
create new AND gate andGate;
ebuP.setGate(andGate);
create new event ebu of type “b is incorrect when exiting u”; add ebu to newEvents;
andGate.addInEvent(ebu);
foreach ei in P do
create new event ep of type “predicate p(ei) holds”;
andGate.addInEvent(ep);
// this event is primary in the initial fault tree so it is not
added to the newEvents set.
Algorithm B.4: DF-4 Elaborate event “b is incorrect when entering v”.
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input : event e of type “execution incorrectly reaches v”
output: newEvents– the new intermediate events generated from applying this template
newEvents ←− {};
create new OR gate orGate;
e.setGate(orGate);
foreach (u→ t) in CD(v) do
create new event eutv called “execution incorrectly reach v from u through (u→ t)”;
orGate.addInEvent(eutv);
create new OR gate orGateTwo; eutv.setGate(orGateTwo);
create new event eOne called “execution incorrectly reach u then from there reach v
through (u→ t)”;
orGateTwo.addInEvent(eOne);
create new AND gate andGate;
eOne.setGate(andGate);
create new event eOneA of type “execution incorrectly reach u”;
andGate.addInEvent(eOneA);
add eOneA to newEvents;
create new event ep of type “predicate p(u, t) holds”;
andGate.addInEvent(ep);
// this is primary event in the initial fault tree so it is not
added to the newEvents set.
create new event epIncorrect of type “predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds”;
orGateTwo.addInEvent(epIncorrect);
add epIncorrect to newEvents;
Algorithm B.5: DF-5 Elaborate event “execution incorrectly reaches v”.
input : event e of type “predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds”
output: newEvents– the new intermediate events generated from applying this template
newEvents ←− {};
create new OR gate orGate;
e.setGate(orGate);
create new event epu called “p(u, t) is incorrect when exiting u”;
orGate.addInEvent(epu);
create new OR gate orGateTwo;
epu.setGate(orGateTwo);
foreach a used in predicate p(u, t) do
create new event eau of type “a is incorrect when exiting u”;
orGateTwo.addInEvent(eau);
add eau to newEvents;
create new FINAL event ep “p(u, t) holds”;
orGate.addInEvent(ep);
Algorithm B.6: DF-6 Elaborate event “predicate p(u, t) incorrectly holds”.
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Figure C.1. Template LS-3 for Event Type “s incorrectly does not throw exception
e”.
C.1 Template LS-3: s incorrectly does not throw exception
e
A Little-JIL step’s specification can contain exceptions the step may throw during
its execution. A non-leaf step may throw exceptions propagated from its sub-steps.
The decision of throwing an exception from a leaf step depends totally on the agent
performing the step. Then the leaf step incorrectly not throwing exception might be
caused by:
• one of the inputs into the step being incorrect,
• the agent’s misperformance.
Figure C.1 shows the template LS-3 to elaborate the event “s incorrectly does not
throw exception e”.
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